The rumors have been around for a few weeks ever since the meeting between the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and junta or State Administration Council (SAC) took place in mid-January in Kunming, brokered by Beijing.

On January 28, a Chinese official gave a speech during the opening occasion of Chinese New Year to welcome the year of snake, outlining that the MNDAA will withdraw from Lashio phase-by-phase, which should be completed before the end of June. He further sweetened the situation that MNDAA will be allowed to keep the other territories captured during the Operation 1027, except Lashio, the junta’s North Eastern Command. However, this still needs to be confirmed, as in principle the SAC isn’t entitled or allowed to alter political map, give away territories without the Parliamentary lawmakers approval or consent, according to military-drafted constitution of 2008.

“It will be withdrawn in stages, in batches, with the last batch to be withdrawn before the end of June,” a Yunnan-based researcher who studies China-Myanmar relations and requested anonymity for security reasons, according to Myanmar Now latest report.

A Chinese government representative visited a Chinese New Year celebration in Lashio yesterday and explained to locals in Chinese the conditions under which the Kokang forces must withdraw from Lashio. The statement included the following: According to the peace agreement, the Kokang forces must withdraw from Lashio this year; there will be no military recruitment in Lashio until June 2025; Lashio residents who have been away can return home; and there will be no more fighting in Lashio. A clip of the speech went viral on social media yesterday, and a Lashio city rehabilitation official told Myanmar Now that the person who made the statement was a Chinese government representative. “They said they were ordered to withdraw. I won’t go into details,” he said.

Reportedly, MNDAA has already told its allies about the agreement reached with the junta, but only hasn’t made it publicly known. Even now it hasn’t uttered anything official from its side on the Lashio withdrawal issue.

On January 16, MNDAA and SAC finally signed a ceasefire agreement after the meetings between the two parties in December 2024.

Reportedly, Chinese authorities have detained the Kokang ethnic leader, Peng Deren who traveled to China in October last year to meet with a Chinese government special envoy. Peng Deren, who is about 59 years old, is the son of MNDAA founder Peng Jaisheng, and China did not allow him to attend the ceasefire talks between the Kokang and the military council in Yunnan province in January.

Various sources from the National Unity Government’s Ministry of Defense, sources close to the ethnic resistance leaders, and sources who study China-Myanmar affairs in Yunnan province, including Kokang sources, confirmed to Myanmar Now of the said agreement. However, it is unclear whether the Kokang will actually implement the agreements.

Analysis

Given such political and military aspects of development the key elements of ceasefire may be summed up as: Withdrawal from Lashio; Pressure from China; Focus on Peace and Development; Unity Among Ethnic Groups; and Chinese Interest.

The Lashio withdrawal seems a necessity for the SAC, China and also MNDAA because it is not only North Eastern Command of the military junta and without which government-to-government relationship to undertake cross-border trade won’t be possible. Naturally, MNDAA will also be given a cut, although not like the extend of its previous demand about a year back, where it asked for 75% tax collected at the border-trade gates.

The pressure from China is, no doubt, the real engine that pushed MNDAA to comply with the Chinese demands, such as considerable pressure on the MNDAA to comply with terms favorable to the junta, including threats against MNDAA leadership and restrictions on supplies crossing into their controlled territories.

MNDAA leader Peng Deren in recent statements, emphasized a commitment to peace and economic development rather than military confrontation. This shift indicates a strategic pivot towards governance and stability within their controlled areas while maintaining autonomy.

MNDAA also expressed intentions to strengthen ties with other ethnic armed organizations and unity within Myanmar, indicating a potential shift towards collaborative governance rather than isolationist strategies. Although how it is going to carry it out by yielding to China’s demand and stop fighting the junta because the majority of the ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) are for uprooting the SAC and exclusion of it altogether from Myanmar political arena.

And finally, there is the Chinese interest, or rather national interest, with China’s broader geopolitical interests in maintaining stability along its border with Myanmar and ensuring that its investments are protected from conflict-related disruptions. This has all along been China’s ultimate goal and the implementation of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) that covers the whole Myanmar cannot be compromised, as it has to be the whole entity, preferably with the SAC involved as a stakeholder.

Moreover, some implications of ceasefire may be listed as: Stability in Northern Shan State; Impact on Other Armed Groups; Future Negotiations; and International Relations.

If adhered to the stability ceasefire could lead to greater stability in northern Shan State, allowing for economic development initiatives that benefit both local populations and Chinese investments.

If this happens, The dynamics created by this ceasefire may influence other ethnic armed groups in Myanmar, potentially leading them to reassess their strategies concerning negotiations with both the junta and external powers like China.

However, whether this temporary ceasefire will resolve the underlying tensions between ethnic groups and the central government may depend on future negotiations crucial to achieve lasting peace.

Concerning international relations, the involvement of China, which actually is the sole mediator-enforcer and referee at the same time, highlights its growing influence in regional politics and its role as conflict transformer involving ethnic armed groups within Myanmar.

Last but not least, if this ceasefire represents a significant step towards reducing hostilities between the MNDAA and SAC will become contagious and stop the civil war eventually in the long run, is anybody’s guess, given the polarized political stance of the ethnic-democratic alliance forces fighting the junta and the junta’s belief that it can still turn the tide to its favor, with the help of Chinese backing.