During his recent visit to Kunming for the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Summit, Myanmar’s military commander, General Min Aung Hlaing, agreed on an agreement with Chinese authorities to form a cooperative security force. This army will be tasked with defending Chinese nationals and businesses in Myanmar.

Observers argue that the presence of external security forces within Myanmar is legally impossible, citing Section 42(B) of the 2008 Constitution, which states that “No foreign troops shall be permitted to be deployed in the territory of the Union.”

However, the SAC regime’s recent decision to have foreign security troops in its territory has shown that laws in this country are designed to promote the military’s interests.

China is Myanmar’s largest investor among 52 nations worldwide, and General Min Aung Hlaing frequently pledged that he would safeguard them. However, it is unlikely that he would work with a foreign private security firm.

According to a 2021 investigation from the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), Chinese nationals hold 29 of the 49 foreign private security firms in Cambodia and Myanmar. China held six of Myanmar’s nine PSCs, according to CNN News Agency. It is believed that these PSCs would not fight against the resistance organizations, but rather safeguard Chinese corporations.

Given the wide spreading of Chinese projects in Myanmar, any security force formed to secure them would most certainly have to be deployed across the country. Currently, there are around 19 Chinese projects in the nation, with resistance groups controlling about 10 of them. Notable instances include the Kunlong and Nawngpha hydropower projects, as well as other road and bridge construction projects in northern Shan State, carried out by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and other non-state armed organizations.

Thus, China has been pushing ethnic armed groups to stop fighting in areas where Chinese projects are situated in order to guarantee the safety and seamless running of its business activities. As can be seen when the MNDAA’s announcement on July 30, 2024 that it will protect Chinese individuals and businesses.

Although it attempted to put pressure on EAO groups, conflicts remain and seem to be intensifying. Thus, in order to secure its businesses China collaborated with the Myanmar military to hire PSC to protect their businesses. In this regard, China has assisted the Myanmar military regime in legitimizing its rule through election arrangements. Again, China has called on Thailand to include representatives from the SAC in the forthcoming December meeting on Myanmar.

With China’s support, these PSCs might potentially grow into strong groups that can exercise negative influence over the EAOs. There are worries that the EAOs may be unable to counter the PSCs’ rising power.

As a result, if the EAOs continue to engage in internal disputes rather than cooperating, they risk becoming de facto security forces for Chinese businesses.