As the military junta’s planned election is approaching fast and going to be held accordingly on December 28, followed by phases which is said to be stretched out into the month of January 2026, the pre-election activities heat up among all stakeholders, each in its own interest and ways to reflect their values and need satisfaction.

Burma’s or Myanmar’s military junta, now styled State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC), has announced a multi-phase general election to begin on December 28, 2025, with subsequent phases planned for January 2026, despite widespread condemnation as a sham designed to legitimize its rule.

The junta, led by Commander-in-Chief General Min Aung Hlaing, has formally ended the four-year state of emergency and established a caretaker administration, though he retains control as acting president and commander-in-chief, maintaining all major levers of power.

The election is expected to be dominated by military proxies Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), with the National League for Democracy (NLD), which won 60% of the vote in 2015 and 2020, barred from participating, including the powerful, outstanding ethnic parties that won majority vote in their respective states, like Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) and Arakan National Party (ANP).

The junta has also dissolved opposition parties, including the National Democratic Force (NDF), citing procedural failures, further narrowing the political space. In fact, the military junta isn’t taking any chance that its projected majority vote will be chipped away in anyway, as the NDF is made up of former NLD members that may still wield some influence and also as a protest voting against the junta’s proxy party USDP.

The military junta projection is as all could see creation of a government similar to USDP-led Thein Sein government, without earnest opposition parties like NLD and ethnic parties like SNLD and ANP, which won majority votes respectively in their home states.

AA leader Tun Myat Naing on election

It is interesting to note what Arakan Army (AA) Chairman General Tun Myat Naing has to say regarding the election.

In an interview with The Irrawaddy on September 28, he said the election is being used in a bad way for the sake of gaining legitimacy by the military junta.

It is the best way to solve the political problem through political means, but the current military clique is using the election in an irrational way, to further its political power hold of the country.

“In order to find solution to the political and military conflict the best way is through political means,” he said.

“But to tread this path basic principle pattern has to be correct. We have to find the basic principle which is for the public and whole country and the peaceful political outlet. Besides, in its implementation people who ought to be involved have to participate and undertake in a way that the majority also accepted. Then this is going to be the right approach,” he added.

“But if the people who ought to be involved are sidelined and just try to push its own desired pattern (made up of the junta’s henchmen), it maybe said that it is unscrupulously trying to achieve legitimacy as a way out,” he pointed out.

“ If we said that we rejected the election the junta will say that we are saying it because we are enemies. But we are just pointing out what is happening (practically on the ground) and telling it how the situation should be handled. So this (the election) isn’t trustworthy” he clarified.

Regarding the question of whether the AA will allow election to be held in its territories, he said: “Whether we will allow the election or not is a question which shouldn’t be asked and no need to answer also, because it (the junta) can’t do it, I can only say this.”

Stance of anti-junta ethnic-democratic forces

Several Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) have rejected the Myanmar military junta’s planned election for December 2025. The Chin National Front, Karenni National Progressive Party, Karen National Union, Kachin Independence Organization, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army have all criticized the election. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) has also rejected the junta’s election plans, declaring that only the UWSA would be allowed to participate in Hopang Township, and threatening severe penalties for those attempting to campaign for the junta’s election. The National Unity Government (NUG), together with the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), which serves as an opposition umbrella group, has also rejected the legitimacy of the election. While the exact total number of EAOs rejecting the election cannot be specified, it is fair to say that multiple prominent EAOs have explicitly opposed it.

SSPC and its allies

On the other side of the spectrum there are those on the side of the military junta. They are the Border Guard Forces (BGFs) and some EAOs.

The Karen BGF headed by Saw Chit Thu; Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA); KNU/KNLA Peace Council (KPC), not affiliated with KNU maintains strength and operates in Karen State under junta alignment; Shanni National Army (SNA); Pa-O National Army (PNO); endorsed junta’s upcoming election, while the SNA and PNO actively are also fighting together with the Burmese junta against the anti-junta opposition forces.

Meanwhile, three Karen armed groups in the state issued a joint statement on September 29, pledging to work together to protect the general election to ensure peace and stability in the country. The armed groups in the state, the Border Guard Force/Karen National Army (BGF/KNA), the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) and the Karen Peace Council (KPC), issued the joint statement after a day-long meeting in Tsek Ka Tay village on September 28. The Karen armed groups are former breakaway groups from the parent KNU-Karen National Union, according to Karen Information Center (KIC) report of September 29.

Another group the 7 EAO Alliance, whose members are Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signatories said it would stay neutral concerning the upcoming election in December.

International community

China has emerged as the most active international supporter of the junta’s electoral road-map, urging regional neighbors and ASEAN to back the vote as a path to stability. Chinese officials, including Foreign Minister Wang Yi, have endorsed the election plan, and China is reportedly providing practical assistance in its preparation. Beijing’s support is driven by strategic interests, particularly the advancement of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which requires a stable environment and potentially increased Chinese influence over Myanmar’s sovereignty. China has also pressured ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) along its border into ceasefire agreements with the junta, including the return of the strategic city of Lashio, captured by resistance forces in 2023.

Russia has also signaled support for the junta, exemplified by junta leader Min Aung Hlaing’s attendance at the 80th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s Victory Day in Moscow in May 2025, where he was received by Chinese President Xi Jinping. This event underscored the growing international diplomatic space the junta is gaining among certain powers.

India’s position appears more ambiguous. While it has reportedly voiced support for the election alongside China and Russia, analysts argue that India lacks a coherent Myanmar policy and risks undermining its own strategic interests by backing the junta. Unlike China, India has little leverage over the military or EAOs and does not possess the same level of economic or military influence. Some experts suggest India should instead support the pro-democracy movement to counter China’s growing dominance, particularly given widespread anti-China sentiment among Myanmar’s public and resistance groups. But as of now India seems to be more inclined to accommodate, toeing China’s active endorsement of the junta’s planned election.

ASEAN remains divided. While China is pushing for ASEAN to endorse the election and normalize relations with the junta, the bloc has not yet formally accepted the process, awaiting further details. Many ASEAN members are cautious, aware that the election lacks inclusivity and is being held amid ongoing civil war. The military currently controls less than 30% of Myanmar’s territory, and major EAOs, including the Arakan Army and the Three Brotherhood Alliance, have rejected the election and continue armed resistance, having captured key regional command centers in 2023 and 2024. Recently, the Malaysian headed delegation which was due to visit Myanmar to find out about the upcoming junta-led election was canceled by the junta at the last moment, fueling speculation that its doesn’t care much about ASEAN pressure, now that China is firmly behind its election plan.

The civil war continues to escalate, with the junta suffering significant battlefield losses and resorting to forced conscription and airstrikes. The humanitarian situation is dire, exacerbated by a devastating earthquake in March 2025 and international funding cuts. Analysts warn that even if the election proceeds, it will likely result in only a “negative peace”—a fragile ceasefire that fails to address deep-rooted ethnic and political grievances.

Most countries, including Western powers, are expected to reject the election as neither free nor fair. However, the emergence of a nominally civilian government after April 2026 may provide regional actors with diplomatic cover to resume higher-level engagement, even if the administration lacks legitimacy.

Analysis

In sum, the following scenarios and speculation may unfold, given the available data and development.

The election will be held in stages, with the first phase covering 102 townships on December 28, while 121 constituencies, including 56 townships, will be excluded due to security concerns.

The junta has justified the election as a step toward stability, but critics, including the UN special rapporteur and Western governments, describe it as a “mirage of an election exercise” and a tool to entrench authoritarian rule.

The logistical challenges are immense, as large parts of the country, including border regions and areas like Rakhine and Chin states, are under rebel control, making voter roll creation and polling station security extremely difficult.

China, a key backer of the junta, supports the election as a “quid pro quo” for preventing regime collapse and has expressed approval, while regional and international actors have urged the junta to prioritize a ceasefire over elections.

The junta has threatened severe punishment for anyone obstructing the election, and the military’s ongoing atrocities, including the bombing of schools and civilian areas, continue to undermine any claim to legitimacy.

The outcome remains uncertain, with analysts divided on whether the election could create space for rival power centers to emerge or if it will simply be a mechanism for Min Aung Hlaing to maintain power through a loyalist successor, especially as succession planning within the military leadership remains unclear.

On top of that the different Karen armed forces latent conflict, due to the junta’s election and possible spillover-effect because of different political outlook, have a tendency to erupt into open conflict in the course of time. Not a desirable development for the anti-junta ethnic-democratic opposition loose alliance, so to speak.