Title: The Politics of Federalization in Myanmar
Author: Dr Dulyapak Preecharish
Year published: 2023

First of all, I would like to thank the author for his gracious quotation of Sao Harn Yawnghwe, Executive Director, Euro-Burma Office (EBO); Col Hkun Okker (I assume it must be him though the author did not mention his name but only the group where he came from, PNLO); and myself.

All of us had discussed with him different but complementary federal models that we thought would be applicable to the country we call Burma/Myanmar. (Page 192-193)

• Sao Harn Yawnghwe on the historical Federated Shan States model founded in 1992 to establish a uniform administrative system by pooling financial resources of different Shan and non-Shan ruling princes for running the federation which, following independence in 1948, became the Shan State.
  “He said that an amalgamation of fragmentary princely states within FSS resembled integration of Malay sultanate states under British Malaya. Some members even elected their leaders, reflecting democratic principles functioning within the system.”

• Col Hkun Okker on India’s hybrid model with a mixture of geographically based states (like Arunachal, Himachal and Bihar) and ethnically based states (like Assam and Nagaland). “However, for him, the Indian model has weaknesses, including a single constitution without autonomous constitutions for constituent states and state governors appointed by the center.”

• Myself, on the Swiss model of power sharing, not only at national level but also at intra-canton/state level allowing no national race/ethnicity to dominate over others. He compared the statues of 4 warriors in the Federal Palace, representing French, German, Italian and Romansh ethnicities, with “monarchical statues at Naypyidaw, comprising three powerful Burman king.”

“Imagine I were one of the 4 main races of Switzerland visiting Bern. Upon seeing those statues, I feel that this is my country and it is my inherent duty to defend it,” I told him. “On the other hand, I don’t feel the same way when I visit Naypyitaw and see the three joint staties. Instead, my thought becomes: These are the people who had taken away our country. My duty therefore is to see that our country returns to its rightful owners.”

“Had we really want to forge unity among us, the statues of leaders signing the 1947 Panglong Agreement would have served the purpose,” I added.

I remember reading a passage about the importance of signs and symbols somewhere: That they convey messages quickly and efficiently without the need for lengthy explanations. Which sums up my impression about the said statues.

Apart from this, not being a scholar but also a notoriously slow reader, I don’t think I can offer much here. Except on the author’s principal rationalization which he calls the three main driving forces of federalization:

Constitutionalism
Conflict Management and
Democratization

To which I fully agree with, especially after equating “Conflict Management” with “Demilitarization of Politics” particularly Burma’s politics.

Many of us are well acquainted with General Carl von Clausewitz’s famous quote:

“War is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a carry out of the same by other means”

Or its shortened form:

War is a continuation of politics by other means

Here we may also want to add Mao Zedong’s quote, which may be relevant:

Politics is war without bloodshed
And war is politics with bloodshed

In other words, military action is a means that can be used to gain ―and maintain―political power.

Nobody needs me to tell him/her that in my country, both the Tatmadaw and EAOs/EROs have long been employing military means to win and consolidate power. No matter who started it first.

That was the reason why, during the peace process that began after the signing of the NCA in 2015, it took so much time on the SSR (Security Sector reintegration) with came about following heated arguments from both sides:

TMD: No question about us going back to the barracks until/unless the EAOs cease to exist or are totally disarmed

EAOs: No disarmament can be expected from us either until/unless soldiers return to the barracks and leave politics to the civilians

The outcome was the negotiations on how both sides would demilitarize phase by phase, while strengthening political institutions at the same time. We were still going through the process, when Covid 19 struck, elections came, and the TMD staged a coup (as generally known) or took control of power (as preferred by the SAC) and put a stop to the seesaw battle without bloodshed.

Now we are back to the old familiar way of slinging mud and demands at each other:

TMD: Abandon the armed struggle, set up political parties and contest the elections organized by us

EAOs (and now PDFs): Definitely no. Until/unless you agree first to return to the barracks.

In the meanwhile, the people of Burma/Myanmar who not only hate dictatorships but also war and violence continue to suffer from both sides.

One of the lessons that can be gleaned out from this experience is that Dr Dulyapak’s two main points of contention: Constitutionalism and Democratization cannot be realized without the achievement of Demilitarization of Politics. And vice versa.

In fact the three components can collectively be likened to a tripod, each leg supporting the creation and consolidation of federalization in Burma/Myanmar. A three-in-one formula, we might say.

Many thanks to Dr Dulyapak for helping me to understand more about what has been plaguing our country. I hope this new way of looking at things will help our leaders who have been working so hard to bring about change that our people have been waiting for since the day the Union Jack was taken over by the Union flag 77 years ago.

Khuensai Jaiyen
5 January 2025