The controversial argument that militarily won territories are allowed to be owned by the conquering party is the mindset which is becoming quite popular in today’s Myanmar conflict spectrum, especially in the aftermath of Operation 1027 led by the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) in 2024.

The 3BHA is made up of the Arakan Army (AA), Kokang or Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA).

Nowhere is this situation more pronounced than in northern Shan State, where the ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) or ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) are in constant loggerheads, and at times, even at each others’ throats.

This controversy rare its head and fast becoming quite an urgent issue in the recent Myanmar context, even though the people and organizations in the field refused to pay due attention to the arising problematic.

Theoretical explanation to the issue is that “The question of whether territories militarily won over are accepted as conquered territories in the 21st century is complex and influenced by international norms, legal frameworks, and geopolitical dynamics. Historically, the right of conquest was a recognized principle in international law, allowing states to acquire territory through force. However, after World War II, the principle of territorial integrity became a cornerstone of international law, with the UN Charter explicitly prohibiting the use of force against the territorial integrity of states.”

“The right of conquest was historically a right of ownership to land after immediate possession via force of arms. It was recognized as a principle of international law that gradually deteriorated in significance until its proscription in the aftermath of World War II following the concept of crimes against peace introduced in the Nuremberg Principles. The interdiction of territorial conquests was confirmed and broadened by the UN Charter, which provides in article 2, paragraph 4, that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” Nations that have resorted to the use of force since the Charter came into effect have typically invoked self-defence or the right of collective defence.” according to Silke Marie Christiansen (2016) in her “Climate Conflicts – A Case of International Environmental and Humanitarian Law.”

While the explanation is concerned with country or nation-state level, the same problematic of the acquisition of territory through force also applies to subnational level conflict, for example like the Shan State of Myanmar.

The recent claims of TNLA and MNDAA territorial conquest and expansion through military might are the case in point. Both parties ventured out from their designated enclaves given to them according to the 2008 Military-drafted Constitution and encroached on the wide range of areas inhabited by Shan/Tai majority, and to a lesser extend, the Kachin population in Kutkai area settlements, known as Kachin Sub-State.

On top of this, while the areas claimed by TNLA and MNDAA after they routed out the military junta’s troops, during the Operation 1027 first and second phase, from their military outposts and garrisons in northern Shan State, the vast areas are still under the influence and also operational territories of the other EAOs like Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) and Kachin Independence Army (KIA). It should be noted that they have been in these areas since decades, even before TNLA was formed. In fact, TNLA was trained and armed by the KIA in 2009.

To make it short, we need to ponder on how this misconceived mindset of “the rights to acquisition of territory through force” which has been instrumental in the ongoing ethnic tension and conflict can be tackled, so that the brewing, heightening inter-ethnic conflict may be averted.

Problem areas

Internationally, the problematic is on how to keep the post-World War II international norms and adherence of territorial integrity or political independence of any nation-state according to the UN Charter. While the UN Charter norms is largely being observed by nation-states, the Iraq’s Saddam Hussein’s annexation of Kuwait, Russian annexation of Crimea, Indonesian annexation of East Timor were examples that contradict or go against Charter’s international norms.

From the above mentioned, only Crimea is still occupied by Russia under the pretext of the protection of ethnic Russian or Russian-speaking population, while the war goes on between the Russian and Ukrainian.

“In general, conquest (the acquisition of territory through force, especially by a victorious state in a war at the expense of a defeated state) is not as significant an issue in international politics as it once was, because territorial expansion is no longer a common ambition among states,” according to The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica.

Domestically in subnational level, the upsurge of ethnonationalism combined with territorial expansionism is the main culprit of inter-ethnic conflict that won’t easily go away anytime soon in Shan State of Burma or Myanmar. And the TNLA and MNDAA are perfect examples which embodied the main cause of ethnic conflict in northern Shan State.

According to available statistic the population census taken in 2014 for the whole Shan State, Shan/Tai population was 1.883,723 or 35.51%; Kokang with 265,536 or 5.01%; and Palaung (Ta’ang) with 332,149 or 6.26%.

In the aftermath of the Operation 1027, MNDAA has roughly expanded its claim of territory by 3 folds of its original ethnic enclave; while the TNLA or Palau ng (Ta’ang) has widened its territorial claim to about from 6 to 7 folds, which included most of the northern Shan State and part of Mandalay Division, Mogok Township.

In short, in northern Shan State, the Shan will have no say at all, if it is according to the wish of TNLA and MNDAA.

Ta’ang Land Council (TLC)

Meanwhile, the Ta’ang Political Consultative Committee (TPCC) announced the formation of the Ta’ang Land Council (TLC) on 9 June, declaring it the highest political authority in self-described Ta’ang State during the ongoing revolutionary period.

The TLC formation was opposed by five Shan civil society groups with a statement on June 11. It pointed out that the TLC administrative mechanism to be established includes towns and cities that have been inhabited and ruled by the Shan people for thousands of years. In addition, the statement said that there are other EAOs besides the TNLA in territories it claims ownership.

However, TNLA is scheduled to meet the military junta on the insistence of China in August in Kunming for the third time, in order to conduct ceasefire negotiation. Rumours are rife that TNLA will yield to the Chinese demand and give back its captured territories, as it won’t be able to withstand the “carrot and stick” tactics of China and military junta combination, which the TNLA has to endure. However, it denied that it has never considered of giving up its captured territories.

In contrast, the MNDAA obeyed the demand of China and gave back Lashio, Military Northeastern Command, that it captured on July 2024, to the military junta and now again being pressured to call back and withdraw its troops from Hsenwi and Kutkai areas back to its original enclave in Kokang Self-Administered Zone, which at the moment is still unclear.

Analysis

As we can see that the two EAOs cling to the notion of ownership of the captured territories as their rights and hoped to pressure the power that be in Naypyitaw to accept their demands without question.

Meanwhile, they muddle through political waters and flex their military muscles to elbow out the other EAOs like KIA and SSPP, resulting in armed clashes and continued military tension. The MNDAA and SSPP clashed in March last year and in April this year again, and at this writing the military tensions are high, although no report of clash has been heard so far.

The TNLA has constant frictions with both the SSPP and also the KIA. It has occupied 11 or so KIA offices, military outposts and check points but due to the toleration of KIA troops no firefight has occurred until today.

Actually, all the EAOs fighting the military regime should give priority to further their original goal of trying to replace the military dictatorship system and establishment of the federal democratic union, and not territorial expansion for their groups as ultimate goal.

Most important of all is to curb their misconception of the right to possession of conquered territories and cooperate them into their self-administered zones by force, which even the present military junta has rejected, arguing that only the civilian parliament can make endorsement according to the given constitutional law.

In the same vein, any democratically elected civilian government after the military regime will also have to adhere to the same procedure in political mapping, redrawing administrative boundaries, and creating new constituent units, according to the needs of the people.

Thus, unless the EAOs, especially the TNLA and MNDAA, could abandon their mindset of the right to possession of conquered territories or territorial expansionism urge, the inter-ethnic conflict will go on, with or without the military junta presence in Myanmar’s political arena.