As expected the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and military junta, now renamed as State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) from State Administration Council (SAC), meeting in Kunming brokered by China ended without tangible outcome, on August 27.

Reportedly, according to Myanmar Now recent report of August 28, the TNLA offered to give up Kyaukme and Hsipaw, two of the towns in northern Shan State that they captured during Operation 1027, in exchange for a ceasefire between itself and the junta.

However, the military commission representatives rejected the offer as insufficient and demanded that the Ta’ang forces give up all but Mantong and Namhsan.

The talks ended without any agreement after the two sides argued over the division of territory.

The military rejected the TNLA’s offer to return Kyaukme and Hsipaw, and said it would go on offensive (and actually been in counteroffensive already) to retake the two towns, Myanmar Now’s source said.

The TNLA seized Hsipaw, Kyaukme, Nawnghkio, Namkham, Namtu, Namhsan, Kutkai, Mantong, Mong Ngaw, Mong Long, Mongmit, in northern Shan State, and Mogok of Mandalay Region during Operation 1027, which began on October 27, 2023. Among these towns, the military commission forces recaptured the strategically important Nawnghkio Town from the TNLA in mid-July.

The TNLA’s offensives stopped after the TNLA announced a ceasefire with the military on November 25, 2024, due to the military’s airstrikes that had caused casualties among the local population and also because of Chinese pressure and interference to stop the armed conflict.

The military launched a renewed offensive in February this year from Taung Kham area, Nawnghkio Township, which had been occupied by the TNLA, and recaptured Nawnghkio Township on July 16.

Accordingly that the next meeting between the TNLA and the Military Commission will be held in Kunming, China, in the last week of October.

Junta in upsurge mood

To date, according to the Burma News International (BNI) report compiled by Myanmar Peace Monitor (MPM) of July 31, 2025, between February 2024 to July 2025, the military junta has retaken back Kawlin (3 months under resistance control), Myawaddy (2 weeks under resistance control ), Hsihseng (3 months under resistance control), Lashio (9 months under resistance control ), Mobye (20 months under resistance control), Nawnghkio (13 months under resistance control ) and Thabeikkyin (11 months under resistance control).

“The military junta announced on 23 July 2025 that it had regained control of Thabeikkyin in Mandalay Region, which had been under resistance forces’ control since 25 August 2024. Similarly, on 16 July 2025, the junta declared it had recaptured Nawnghkio in northern Shan State, which had been held by the TNLA and allied resistance groups since 26 June 2024.”

“Furthermore, on 2 July 2025, the junta announced it had regained control of Mobye in southern Shan State, which had been under resistance forces in the Karenni State since 13 November 2023. Notably, within the single month of July 2025, the junta took back three towns previously lost to resistance forces, allowing it to capitalize on its recent victories to further its propaganda efforts,” according to the BNI report.

Analysis

Looking at the scenarios unfolding, the TNLA’s moral is depleting as the military junta’s psychology seems to be surging, especially with the military victory and advancement it has made during these few weeks.

As the situation now stands, the TNLA may now have to think whether it will cut the deal with the junta even though it will have to abandon its expanded Ta’ang State aspirations and ambition and sign ceasefire to go back to square one; or if it will wholeheartedly join the National Unity Government/People’s Defense Force (NUG/PDF) and Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs) loose alliance setup and go for broke in `do or die´ mode; or try to escape between the horns of not really on either side of the contenders or stakeholders.

The first scenario of capitulation to the junta and China pressure may be able to circumvent the human toll which has the real possibility to unfold, if the KIA and the Bamar PDFs and Local Defense Forces (LDFs) don’t pitch in like during the Operation 1027.

The second scenario of joining the NUG/PDF and EROs loose alliance setup may be the move to be on the right side of history but it will be a long to medium bitter fight, which the TNLA could consider. But it still needs to convince the allies that it is trustworthy and really mean it by abandoning its narrow ethnonationalism, racial supremacy doctrine and territorial expansion urge, at the expense of other ethnic groups within northern Shan State, which it has shown time and again during and in the aftermath of Operation 1027.

The third scenario of escaping between the horns like the United Wa State Army (UWSA), Mongla or National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and Shan State Progress Army (SSPP) won’t be easy for the TNLA, as it doesn’t have the economic power and firing power, unable to fend off junta’s airstrikes, including help from the allies that would fend for it in unison. The present situation now portrays that it isn’t comparable to the said three EROs as they have never directly challenge the military junta directly like the TNLA.

In sum, the TNLA may have to think hard and make profound decision from the three choices mentioned for its people in order to survive as an ethnic group, which is barely 500,000, and can’t afford to bet all of the Ta’ang population or put all the eggs in one basket, so to speak.