During the week, the issues of political power transfer, civilian awareness-building, inter-ethnic conflict and nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) endorsement of the parliament have been dominating the media landscape.
The detailed procedure on power transfer or rather the duty transfer, as U Ye Htut the information minister insists to be termed, from Thein Sein’s quasi-civilian government to Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) incoming regime, meetings have been taking place at an unimaginable speed, while the mass mobilization by the NLD to clean up the streets across the country and inter-ethnic armed conflict out burst in the northern part of Shan State between the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA-S) and the Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA), threatening to create a cockpit of anarchy, coupled with NCA endorsement and approval of the parliament, followed by its deliberation to launch political dialogue within the tenure of Thein Sein regime.
In addition, the UNFC, non-signatories of government initiated partial ceasefire agreement, met in Chaingmai from 7 to 10 December, to map out it’s political course, in the wake of NLD’s election victory.
Power transfer procedure
Following Aung San Suu Kyi’s meetings with the President Thein Sein, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hliang and the retired but very much influential Senior-General Than Shwe, the power transfer procedure have been the talk of the town.
Since a few weeks, to oversee and work out the procedure for transition, the government and NLD have each formed a team.
The government’s committee members include Union Minister Hla Tun as chairman, Information Minister Ye Htut, President’s Office members Zaw Htay and Hla Tun, and Construction Ministry deputy director-general Maung Maung Ohn, while the NLD’s team is comprised of the party’s central executive committee members Win Htein and Dr Myo Aung, along with former Rangoon University rector Dr Aung Thu.
Reportedly, the government’s transitional supporting committee and NLD’s transformation team will start to meet soon, which is hoped to be finished by the middle of January 2016, according to U Win Htein central committee member of the NLD.
“The second parliamentary session would have to start three months after the elections according to the constitution. So before the start of the parliamentary session, transfer and acceptance of projects have to be finished. The election was finished on 8 November and new parliamentary (session) must be started by 8 February (2016). We must try to finish it within January,” said U Win Htein.
Likewise, House Speaker Thura Shwe Mann and Aung San Suu Kyi met on 19 November to smooth out the entry of newly elected MPs to the parliament. At the end of the meeting the duo issued a joint statement which includes five points—to fulfil the need to satisfy the people’s desire resulted from the 8 November general elections in systematic and peaceful manner, to carry out the duties assigned by the people in accord with Hluttaw (parliament) policies, to place emphasis on national reconciliation and national unity at a time when Hluttaws are formed, to hand down good traditions compatible with mutual respect by negotiating important issues and parliamentary affairs and to hold coordination meetings to be able to officially call the Second Pyithu Hluttaw (parliament) meetings in accord with the law.
According to Eleven Media, on December 10, Shwe Mann, Union Parliament, Khin Aung Myint, the Speaker of Upper House, Aung San Suu Kyi, Nanda Kyaw Swa, the Vice Speaker of Union Parliament and other officials met at Zabuthiri Hall in Naypyitaw.
“Suu Kyi and I issued the statement. The meeting is aimed at starting the implementation of the agreement. It is a part of the whole implementation. This meeting is related to the announcement of the statement,” Shwe Mann said.
He stressed that the sessions of the First Pyithu Hluttaw (parliament) will be over on 30 January 2016 and the Second Pyithu Hluttaw meeting will have to be called. Moreover, he added that the speakers of different regional and states parliaments will also be called and named.
Civilian awareness-building
On 13 December morning, Suu Kyi led the campaign of cleaning up the environment by collecting trash in the Rangoon township of Kawhmu.
The NLD’s campaign’s stated goals are said to be the improvement of public health, to present a more attractive image of the country in light of the rising number of foreign tourists arriving in Burma, and to demonstrate that social change can occur swiftly with public participation.
The Suu Kyi inspired campaign was followed in various part of the country, including almost all Townships in Yangon Region, Lashio, Taunggyi, Mongywa, Mawlamyine, Meiktila, Indaw, Tavoy, Myaik, Kyaukpadaung and Shwebo, enthusiastically by the NLD members and non-members alike, interpreting it in a variety of ways.
The Irrawaddy reported: “I have never witnessed this kind of scene in my life,” said local resident Than Hla, 74, who proudly displayed the plastic gloves he had donned to participate. “It is the best kind of work. We have had many leaders, but she has given excellent advice to us, to start the change with this activity.”
In the same breath Eleven Media wrote: “The desire of NLD chairperson is that we have to take responsibility individually and for change to come from the people. We have to carry out garbage collection daily, we have to divide the garbage into re-usable and unusable waste. The use of plastic bags, which will affect the environment for long time, should be reduced. We have to educate the people,” said Zwe Nanda from the Daw Khin Kyi Foundation.
Still, some said Suu Kyi’s sweeping away the rubbish should be also applied to the political dirt that has plague the country for so long.
Inter-ethnic conflict
Although positive and affirmative development could be registered on the political reconciliation facet, the inter-ethnic conflict in northern Shan State between the RCSS/SSA-S and the PSLF/TNLA threatened to implicate the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and as well the Burma Army (Tatmadaw), as a likely military alliance of RCSS and Tatmadaw might escalate the seemingly unstoppable conflict that has been going on for sometimes.
The RCSS said the fighting, which began on November 27 lasted for four days. While TNLA said since 30 November there has been no more armed clashes, RCSS source on 12 December said that it is reinforcing its troops in Mongwi, where its troops have been besieged by the TNLA.
The RCSS said its fighters were ambushed by the TNLA on their way back to their own territory, after receiving training and instruction on the nationwide ceasefire agreement in Loi Tai Leng headquarters that it had signed with the government on October 15.
It categorically denied that the Tatmadaw has been helping RCSS in its clashes with the TNLA and that it has trespassed their areas.
In a recent interview with the RFA on 11 December, Colonel Sai Hla of RCSS said: “The TNLA come and attack us claiming that we take over their area. Namkham is not Palaung Self-Administrative Zone and also not Kachin State, but Shan State. These areas are owned by the Shans. Our troops have been stationed here even before the TNLA reverted back to armed struggle. I want to ask what kind of reason they have to claim that we take over their area.”
On 14 December, Colonel Mai Phone Kyaw told RFA that RCSS is being used by the Tatmadaw, while it is also taking advantage to expand its area of control with Tatmadaw’s help.
He said that TNLA, KIA fourth Brigade and Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-North (SSPP/SSA-N) are active in the area and have been at war with the Burma Army.
Regarding the RCSS’s position that as a Shan resistance force it could move its troops anywhere it likes in Shan State, Mai Phone Kyaw said he has no objection if it is not doing it in collaboration with the Tatmadaw. But now it is unacceptable for it is coming in to expand its area of control and restrict their movements. He accused that the RCSS has no desire for ethnic cooperation and said its troops count is now reaching about a thousand.
On 15 December, in an attempt to defuse the armed confrontation with the TNLA, Sao Yawd Serk leader of the RCSS met with UNFC leaders, who were tasked to act as mediators in Chiangmai. But the outcome has not been known and the TNLA people were also not present at the meeting.
To make matter worse, 7 Day Daily on 12 December wrote that the KIA also accused the RCSS for trespassing its fourth Brigade areas, in northern Shan State.
Colonel Maran Zau Taung of KIA said: “ At this moment (We) are trying our best to avoid clashes. (We) don’t want to open new war fronts against our own (ethnic resistance groups). (We) feel there is no profit in it. But if (they) reach (trespass) our place it would be unavoidable.”
Meanwhile, the SSPP/SSA-N and Tatmadaw confrontation front in central Shan State the temporary ceasefire is holding following talks in Naypyitaw on 7-8 December, while a more durable truce on demarcation would be worked out on the 17 December in Kholam Burma Army’s Central Eastern Command between the two parties, according to Sai Phone Harn, the SSPP’s information department.
Parliament approved NCA
On 8 December, Union Parliament approved the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signed between the government and eight ethnic armed groups in mid-October, according to parliament sources.
The framework for political dialogue inclusive of all stakeholders was drafted by a special drafting committee of the tripartite Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC).
On 15 December, the framework was approved by the UPDJC, which in turn would be submitted to President U Thein Sein, said Union Peace-Making Work Committee’s leader U Aung Min.
The approval of the framework will be followed by the first round of formal dialogue by January 15, 2016 in accordance with the timeline of the term of NCA reached between the government and eight armed groups out of a total 21 on 15 October and approved by the Union Parliament on 8 December.
From the outset, the two sides were to draw up a political framework within 60 days after the formal NCA signing and start a political dialogue within 90 days.
Earlier, Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) Vice-Chairman Thu Wai told Mizzima on December 9 that President Thein Sein will announce the commencement date for political dialogue on December 16.
“The President will issue his notification on December 16 for the date for beginning of political dialogue and then we will do preparatory work for it and then the political dialogue for peace will begin around Christmas or after Independence Day which falls on January 4,” he said.
The UNFC leaders Nai Han Tha and as well Khu Oo Reh, however, rejected the political framework drawn by just 8 ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), which exclude the seven non-signatories of the NCA and also three armed groups – the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Arakan Army (AA) and TNLA – that the government refused to accept as negotiation partners.
On 12 December, UNFC released a five point statement rejecting the parliament approved NCA. It writes:
“On December 8, 2015, the parliament adopted the NCA, which all the Ethnic Armed Resistance Organizations (EAROs) having participated throughout the time of formulation of the NCA, were not able to sign. Adopting an agreement lacking nationwide character and, if it were implemented without the inclusion of all, just as the result desired by all cannot be achieved, a comprehensive peace likewise cannot be established.”
The statement also pointed out that Thein Sein government, with the intention of implementing the NCA, has been trying feverishly with only some of the EAOs to finish drafting the framework for political dialogue, while offensives in Shan and Kachin States go on unabated.
The seven EAOs that so far still refused to sign the NCA are Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Karenni National Progressive Party(KNPP), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), New Mon State Party (NMSP), National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K), Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF), Shan State Progressive Party/Shan State Army-North (SSPP/SSA-N) and United Wa State Army (UWSA).
The eight signatories of the armed groups are Karen National Union (KNU), Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)-Peace Council, Pa-O Nationalities Liberation Organization (PNLO), All Burma Students’Democratic Front (ABSDF), Chin National Front (CNF), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) / Shan State Army-South (SSA-S).
Analysis
The power transfer procedure seems to be progressing at a remarkable speed with people involved from both sides cooperating and coordinating, according to the reports. The government, as well as the parliament have been working in tandem to make the transition smooth. Thus, the NLD and public angst that the 1990 post-election scenario, when the then military regime refused to hand over political power to the election winning NLD and put its leaders in jail, will be repeated could be suited down and generally presumed that it has been an unnecessary worry.
Aung San Suu Kyi led campaign of picking trash to clean the environment could be seen as a move of to combine building public awareness, civic duties, empowering public confidence and taking responsibility, while also proving her ability of soft power mobilization to shock and awe the hard power on how much influence and legitimacy she and the NLD possess. Seen from this point of view, the campaign could be taken as successful.
The out break of inter-ethnic conflict, although the RCSS and TNLA take pains to explain that it is not an ethnic conflict but only a conflict between armed organizations, the tendency that the situation could blow out of proportion is quite high. For the TNLA accusation of RCSS to be militarily cooperating with the Tatmadaw to expand its areas of influence could lead to a more complicated war within Shan State.
Apart from that the KIA fourth Brigade has been reported to be wary of RCSS troops infringing on its territories and that war could break out, if the Shan troops intrude despite warning. And if the Tatmadaw would actively get involve in the fight, along side of the RCSS, the war will intensify and all could say good bye to the nationwide ceasefire deliberation. All parties involved in the conflict should defuse the situation before things get out of control, to save the peace process, if not for other reason.
Regarding the implementation of NCA and the recently pushed framework for political dialogue, it should be remembered that it is not all-inclusive as the heading suggests in the first place, but only a partial-ceasefire agreement, involving only 8 from 21 EAOs that inhabited the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.
Numerically, the 21 EAOs have some 100,000 troopers, whereas the 8 EAOs that had signed the partial-ceasefire numbered some 10,000 or 15,000 at the most. Such being the case, any agreement excluding the bulk of some 850,000 troops is bound to be incomplete and invalid, even with the blessing of the parliament.
And assuming that the parliamentary approved NCA and the framework that follows would be agreed and endorsed by the non-signatories is tantamount to a wishful-thinking, if not a cheap form of blackmail. It is not enough to argue that the non-signatories were also in agreement with the 32 Sections of the NCA, except for the last Sections 33, which called for all-inclusiveness that the Thein Sein regime has rejected. In a legal sense, if one part of the Sections is not agreed, the whole treaty or document cannot be taken as valid. So far as treaties are concerned, there is a famous saying “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”.
It is well and good that the Thein Sein regime is going ahead, entertaining the illusion of wishful-thinking that its NCA implementation, starting with drawing framework for political dialogue, convening political dialogue, achieving Union Accord and all the way to the establishment of a federal union could be pulled through with just 8 EAOs’ participation and endorsement, together with the government and political parties.
No doubt, if the present regime or the incoming NLD government could eventually empower this peace process to snowball and gradually include the non-signatories, it will be successful. But it will all depend on how the non-signatories will be accommodated in the process and whether their all-inclusiveness and nationwide ceasefire demand are appropriately addressed.
To this end, the incoming NLD would need to walk a fine line of pleasing the military clique, which harbours ethnocentrism and military supremacy tendencies, and understanding the worries, grievances and aspirations of the ethnic nationalities as a whole. Failing this, the country could fall back into the cockpit of anarchy in no time, as the ongoing inter-ethnic conflict now raging in Shan State suggests.
