Patrick Meehan

Department of Development Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, UK

Published online: 19 May 2015

Leaders in Naypyitaw, especially the Tatmadaw, may not agree to Pat Meehan’s conclusion that the ongoing war on drugs waged by them since Independence is not working. But they should read his 30-page paper, if they are not going to have another 5 year extension in 2019.

As the author sees it, the Burma Army’s paramount self-appointed mission is to expand its control over every square inch of the country’s remotest areas, especially in Shan State.

Accordingly, “over one quarter of the entire Tamadaw is based in Shan State, eighty-nine infantry or light infantry battalions operate in southern Shan State alone,” compared to single battalion during the British days.

Military expansion that came after the bloody coup in 1988 was followed by the “live off the land” policy and “decentralization of command and concentration of ministerial authorities in the hands of regional commanders, which opened up opportunities for regional commands to engage in various businesses.”

Curiously this move was in line with what the celebrated Chinese warrior-philosopher Sun Zi wrote in his The Art of War: A wise general strives to feed off the enemy. Each pound of food taken from the enemy is equivalent to twenty pounds you provide by yourself. (Thomas Cleary translation)

One of the army’s income generators inevitably was opium. “In some areas the Tatmadaw has collected tax directly from poppy farmers, threatening to destroy crop if taxes were not paid. This was a regular practice in the 1990s when some taxes were even paid in opium rather than cash. More commonly, tax collection is managed through the village headman who has to collect a designated amount of tax from the community for the local Tatmadaw camp.”

Another significant move was the upgrading of the local militias who were granted immunity for their involvement in drugs “in return for fighting insurgency, ensuring local stability, and providing access to areas under their control. In this way, Tatmadaw battalions benefit indirectly from the drug trade by creating unofficial protection rackets that allow them to profit from their connections with the militias while keeping a layer of distance and subterfuge between themselves and drug profits.”

These self-financing counter-insurgency militia commanders were portrayed as “national races leaders” and their involvement in drugs glossed over as long as their allegiance to the government is assured. Indeed, many of them are “elected” representatives in the Parliament that came into being after the 2010 elections.

This two-pronged strategy, “Tatmadaw expansion and formation of proxy militias have increased the territorial reach of state authority by securitizing remote areas and extending control over populations and resources in these areas. The construction of the oil and gas pipelines, which tread a path through former insurgent-controlled territory, would have been unthinkable a mere two decades ago. Today they embody the very tangible consolidation of state control.”

However, the author’s analysis is that this type of “negotiated statehood” will not be stable, due to several reasons:

For one thing, it is effective at “managing conflict rather than resolving it”. To put it plainly, neither the issue of power distribution with the non-Burman states or the drug problem is resolved.

For another, these coalitions between the military and the local armed groups “are likely to be at their weakest and most unstable,” as shown by the breakup of the 20 year long alliance with Kokang’s Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in 2009, following its refusal to become a Burma Army controlled Border Guard Force (BGF).

The third is “the contradiction between localized strategies of state consolidation and internationally accepted norms of the ‘proper’ role of the state. This contradiction makes establishing durable and stable state-society relations through interaction with the illicit trade of opium problematic.”

One result is the entry of the “apolitical people whose sole interest in life is trade and profit” who thrive on war and conflict. “Over the years traders and investors have shifted their allegiance to whichever groups have proved best able to secure their access to opium and cross-border markets. In southern Shan State the investments have shifted from KMT networks, to the MTA, to the UWSA, and now increasingly also to militia groups with close links to the Tatmadaw.”

Reading and pondering over it, one cannot help but conclude that until and unless the root causes of the conflict—broken promises of Panglong—are properly addressed, Burma will continue to be headache and a nausea both to itself and the rest of the world.

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2015.1041280