From 3-6 August, I went to attend a marathon series of workshops and a brainstorming session. Firstly, on the merging of hither to hostile armed forces and then on the current peace process.

The following is what I think will be useful for readers who are concerned with Burma’s peace and prosperity. As usual, few personal names will be used so the blame, if there is any, falls only on the writer.

Day One. Wednesday, 3 August 2016.

When the owl says the crow’s black

The crow finds fault with the owl’s protruding eyes

(Shan proverb)

The workshop’s title is “Building Decentralized Security Systems in Myanmar,” a continuation of last month’s “Merging of Former Adversarial Armed Forces.” The resource person is Steve Hege, United States Institute of Peace (USIP).

According to USIP website, he has over 15 years of experience working with the UN, international NGOs, think tanks and governments on issues related to security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), among others.

There are both positive and negative aspects to merging of adversarial forces (as it is with everything elsein this world), he tells us.

The positive side

1. Difficulty for the two sides to revert to war
2. No need to surrender to each other. Both sides continue to be able to defend themselves
3. Employment for all combatants
4. Symbolizes National Reconciliation and (mutual) forgiveness
5. Facilitates political negotiations
6. Fills certain gaps in capacity (In Nepal’s case, the armed forces gain terrain skill, which had come naturally to the Maoist guerrillas)
7. Leads to greater representation and credibility
8. Better relations with community

At the same time, there are negative aspects that have to be dealt with such as:

1. Discord and rivalries within security services
2. Parallel chains of command
3. Perception of marginalization for former non-state actors who have become subordinate to the army
4. Undermined professionalism
5. Other challenges include the government army’s typical reluctance to recognize the military ranks of its former opponents, their difference in political ideologies/mindsets, and the former guerrillas attachment to their localities. (I remember reading in Barbara Tuchman’s March of Folly the British unwillingness to address the George Washington, the American rebels’ commander-in-chief as ‘General Washington’, calling him instead as ‘Mr Washington.’)

Luckily, there are ways to deal with them, such as joint training, joint study tour, establishing quota for officers training and short time deployment.

Here are some of the input from the participants:

• Positive discrimination for former guerrillas during the mutually agreed transitional period (For example, high school graduates for Burmans, but middle school graduates for non Burman cadets)
• Pre-training training for former guerrilla officers
• New indoctrination (what is derogatorily known as brainwashing) curriculum

Before the day ends, Steve asks us to do some thinking exercise:

• What are Tatmadaw’s core interests?
• What are its fears?
• What are its ‘low hanging fruits’, which it considers no big deal to offer the EAOs?

So how do the participants respond to them? But that is for tomorrow.