These days, speculation over Section 59(f), the conflict in northern Shan State and government hastily arranged fire sale or sell-off of its assets, coupled with granting economic development rights are the most talk about and crucial issues making the rounds.
As 17 March draws nearer, the National League for Democracy (NLD) is pressed to come up with a decision whether to fight for Aung San Suu Kyi’s right to become president through tabling a motion to waive the 59(f) Section, which only needs a simple majority that could easily be achieved given the NLD domination in parliament, or decides for a proxy or nominee president to be installed.
According to Larry Jagan’s writing in the Bangkok Post, Suu Kyi is said to be resigned not to ruffle the military’s (Tatmadaw) feathers by deciding not to push for amendment Section 59(f) of the constitution or file for a motion, in the parliament to waive the clause for her, so that she could become president, but instead go for a foreign minister position, where she will be able to participate in National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) and also could control the proxy president that she had said she would install.
NDSC is the highest powerful authority in the state with a body of 11 members, where the military has 6 votes and the NLD 5 votes. Besides, it controls the Defence, Home and Border Affairs Ministries, coupled with a 25 percent appointed military representatives in all the Upper, Lower, States and Regions Parliament.
However, most recently on 29 February, news begin to make the rounds that Aung San Suu Kyi is likely to speed up elections of the country’s president, from 17 March to 10 March, in a last-minute change following weeks of fruitless talks with the military that hasn’t budged from its stance of maintaining the constitution that bars her from assuming the presidency; most notably the Section 59(f).
The armed clashes between the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA) and Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA) have de-escalated and largely died down, as the military started to go into the contested, northern Shan State areas in mid-February, declaring area cleansing and that both warring parties should retreat, with the endorsement of the parliament.
Meanwhile, a row between the appointed military MPs and the NLD occurred, as a NLD representative questioned the hastily conducted government’s assets sell-off or fire sales and handling of the business concessions.
The military MPs were so upset that all literally stood up in protest of the debate, which involved the controversial Letpadaung copper mine mineral extraction, which is a large mine project operated by the Wanbao Mining Copper Ltd. company, in cooperation with the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd (UMEHL).Wanbao is a subsidiary of China North Industries Group Corp. or Norinco, a large arms manufacturer.
Suu Kyi’s position on 59(f)
According to recent SHAN report, a government peace broker, during a break in the meeting in Chiangmai with the RCSS/SSA on Monday, 22 February, said that amendment, or even suspension, of Article 59 (f) is out of the question.
“It is not her (Aung Sun Suu Kyi) but who will come after her that’s the problem,” said the source. “It will set a dangerous precedent for future presidents.”
“But we have no objection if she chooses to become a foreign minister,” he added. A foreign minister is a member of the country’s most powerful organ, the 11 person National Defence and Security Council (NDSC). Other member are: The President, 2 Vice Presidents, Speaker of Lower House, Speaker of Upper House, Commander-in-Chief, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Defence Minister, Home Minister and Border Affairs Minister. The last three ministers are appointed by the Commander-in-Chief.
According to the article, a President or a Vice President “himself, one of the parents, the spouse, one of the legitimate children or their spouses (shall) not owe allegiance to a foreign power, not be subject of a foreign power or citizen of a foreign country. They shall not be persons entitled to enjoy the rights and privileges of a subject of a foreign government or citizen of a foreign country.”
Larry Jagan, in his Bangkok Post article also said that the commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing has consistently told Suu Kyi at all three of their meetings since the elections, that the army considered itself the guardians of the constitution.
Whatever the case, the immediate show down between the military and the NLD might have been averted, although negotiations on other remaining issues still appear to have failed, according to Ko Ko, editor of the independent newspaper, Democracy Today and CEO of the Yang on Media Group.
Northern Shan State conflict
After the intensity of clashes between the RCSS/SSA and TNLA reduced to only sporadic fire fights, on 12 February, citing the Ministry of Defence, The Global New Light of Myanmar reported that the Burmese military had issued an ultimatum that the RCSS/SSA withdraw from Kyaukme and Namhsan townships as the military prepared an assault on TNLA soldiers in the area. The RCSS reportedly has refused to comply with.
The military has instructed both the RCSS and TNLA to pull back to their territorial boundaries prior to the fighting, and warned that it would launch a “clearance” operation against them if they refuse.
When asked, whether the military’s ultimatum is meant to drive back the RCSS troops from contested areas by force and what it intended to do, a reliable Shan source replied: “The Burma Army units in the field have not been looking for RCSS positions. Naypyitaw said that it would do what it should, and we do what we should, they told RCSS commanders through villagers.”
RCSS and TNLA have been locked in a territorial dispute since November 2015. In October 2015, the RCSS signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the Burmese regime, while it blocked the much smaller TNLA from signing, despite the group’s participation in drafting the ceasefire document.
Following the military’s ultimatum, TNLA spokesperson Tar Parn La told DVB that it had ramped up its presence in the area. Tar Parn claimed that the TNLA had seen at least seven clashes with Tatmadaw forces between 14 and 25 February, adding the group had come under fire by Burmese helicopters on two occasions.
As a result of the military offensive, employing thousands of troops, Myanmar Times recently reported that refugees from Namhsan area where the fighting was intense were fleeing, while some few hundreds were going back to areas of government and RCSS controlled areas, to save whatever possessions are left to salvage.
Row between NLD and USPD-Military clique
The row between the NLD and USDP-Military regime came about on February 26 amid a debate over recent privatisations that has infuriated the government, and prompted presidential spokesperson U Ye Htut to suggest the outgoing administration does not need to be accountable to parliament, according to Myanmar Times of 29 February.
On February 25, Daw Khin San Hlaing, MP from NLD listed a number of cases that had arisen since the November elections, involving several government departments and state and regional governments, in which government assets were being disposed of by a “fast-track” procedures that appeared to by-pass the necessary arrangements and negotiations. Her proposal was approved by 271 votes to 138.
The MP for Sidoktaya township, Magwe Region, U Kyaw Aung Lwin, on February 26 was speaking in support of a proposal by his NLD colleague, Daw Khin San Hlaing, calling for scrutiny of an apparent fire-sale of government assets in the closing days of the existing administration, when appointed military MPs took a stand, literally, to object to a statement he made about the Letpadaung copper mine – a project that involves a military holding company.
On the same 26 February, one day after the parliament approved announcement, following the refusal of the relevant government officials to appear before the lawmakers, Information Minister Ye Htut defended the government ministries and said to the state media that Khin San Hlaing’s request appeared to be an accusation, according to RFA report of the same day.
“We will not come and explain things that have been said to discredit the government, but on a national level if we think an explanation is in order, we are willing to do so case by case,” he said.
Ye Htut further stressed: “Whether the incumbent Union government should be accountable to the second parliament or not is an issue to be reviewed according to the constitution,” adding that the government had decided to “suspend” its cooperation with parliament on responding to questions and proposals.
But the constitution doesn’t mention of government only being accountable to the parliament that elected the president.
Perspective
All in all the peaceful power transfer is still not on the safe side as Ma Ba Tha nationalist has made their political position known that it is against the suspension of the 59(f) Clause in any way and would join hands with the military to the very end in protecting it.
Besides no one knows that the regime’s row with the NLD, resulting from NLD accusation of its fire sale or sell-off and irregular granting of business concessions could develop into a “we” against “them” sort of position and mentality, that could heighten the animosity and even become a barrier to the peaceful power transfer.
The military offensives on TNLA is questionable, for measured response, instead of all-out annihilation should be the aim. With the military employing thousands of troops, it could hardly be seen as a maintenance of peace.
In addition, the war in the northern Shan State, which the military vowed to get rid of all armed groups operating within the vicinity, could also become a pretext to declare emergency rule that could usher into two-tier administration, one relatively democratic Bamar populated heartland and the other, the oppressive, military administered ethnic hinterland, if not postponing the whole process of peaceful power transfer to the NLD.
However, no one is looking forward to such a scenario, except those who think that they will lose their privileges and must drive a cleavage at all cost, to be able to cling to military-dominated status quo. For the future of the country lies in proper political power and resources sharing among the ethnic groups and people of Burma, rooted in the principle of democracy, and any hindrance caused to this development would be a drawback that we all could ill-afford.
