Coincidentally the hundred days count of National League for Democracy (NLD) regime’s in office fell on the 54th anniversary 7 July students’ massacre day committed by the then military government of General Ne Win. The NLD endorsed U Htin Kyaw took over the presidential post from the former President Thein Sein’s quasi-civilian rule on 30 March 2016.
While it is hard to say if this is a good or bad omen, the population of the country and observers were inclined to ponder and make assessment of the one hundred days NLD regime in office, which began to surface from various quarters, in a form of a report card.
Let us have a good look on some of these and try to make a constructive criticism that might perhaps be beneficial for all the people involved in this deeply divided society, where the struggle for national reconciliation is paramount to the survival of this nascent democracy.
Of all the assessment, the recent BBC correspondent Jonah Fisher picks out some of the key themes from the first three months of NLD administration that could be said as quite comprehensive.
He pointed out that:
- The issue of Aung San Suu Kyi being barred from becoming president is effectively resolved, as she now occupies a more influential position of state counsellor, which is more powerful than those of the president.
- One of Suu Kyi’s core election campaign pledges is now hardly mentioned, as she appears to have accepted that the constitution is a “red line” for the army that could threaten her government’s survival. She now parrot the long-stated army position that this issue can only be addressed when there is a stable peace agreement with the country’s many armed groups.
- In order to re-invigorate the stalled peace process that the previous president Thein Sein left behind, she now embarks on “The 21st Century Panglong Conference” (21CPC), which is hoped to draw inspiration from the Panglong Agreement of 1947, that her father signed with three ethnic homelands.
- While peace process talks are underway, the Burmese army has continued fighting armed ethnic groups in three states.
- Conditions are still miserable for the 100,000 or so Rohingya in camps, and not much better for the several hundred thousand who live restricted lives elsewhere in Rakhine State. To date Ms Suu Kyi has formed a committee but offered no long-term solution for a stateless group of people who are still being denied basic human rights.
- The problem of political prisoners remains and the Myanmar’s repressive laws are still putting people behind bars. To its credit, the Burmese parliament has started changing some of the worst laws, but this will take time.
- Suu Kyi remains reluctant to speak up for Muslims, while she has reached out to some ethnic individuals, giving them high governmental positions.
While Channel NewsAsia noted that according to some political watchers, the government has paid less attention to other important issues such as transport, social welfare, religious affairs, fresh communal violence and frequent power outages, other media outlets were mostly common in highlighting the plight of the Muslim population and the need to tackle the problem.
Various interpretation on one hundred days in office
Quite a lot of opinion could be seen in trying to interpret the NLD’s one hundred days in office assessment.
Some said a hundred days is too short to overcome the massive problems accumulated during more than 50 years military misrule, while the others said that it is new political tradition which neither fits nor is appropriate for a country like Myanmar, as it is, in reality, not a fully-fledged democracy but just a quasi-civilian one, pointing out the military-drafted constitution, 25% MP nomination, without having to go through election, in various parliament to overseeing the the three ministries of home, defence and border affairs.
Still the others said that failure to articulate a clear direction for the country is a lost opportunity.
Khin Maung Zaw, a political analyst, said the administration could have made better use of its first months in office. “The first 100 days are important for a new government to give people the impression of how confident and reliable they are to lead and govern our country for the next five years. At that point, in my opinion, they lost that opportunity,” according to recent report of Channel NewsAsia.
In an interview with The Associated Press, Information Minister Pe Myint cited the government’s main achievement to date as progress toward a two-fold “national reconciliation” — between civilians and military, the majority Burman people and the ethnic minorities, which make up about 40 percent of the population.
“I believe we are moving in a positive direction,” he said. “The main aim is to build a democratic federal union.”
Analyst Dr Khin Zaw Win, director of the Tampadipa Institute gave credit to the regime for starting the rule of law campaign in Yangon townships, which has yet to be broadened, and putting a lot of efforts on the peace process. But added: “She’s running the government like the way she’s running the party and that’s not really advisable or realistic at all,” he said. “In Myanmar, the pass grade is 40. Definitely, it would be less than 50, I’m sorry to say. And because you don’t want to give her an F, let’s say 45. She passes, but barely.”
But an objective and even sympathetic sounding remarks made by Bertil Lintner, an author of several books on Myanmar is that “People were expecting miracles (after Suu Kyi’s victory). But first of all it is important to remember that this is a government with very limited power. The government has hobbled along and been blamed for actions which are beyond its control.”
A rare affirmative and positive assessment made by The Voice Journal editor Kyaw Min Swe, reported by the BBC, is noteworthy.
He said that the new regime was able to consolidate the government structure, implement the rule of law and putting efforts on peace process through 21 Century Panglong initiative.
He further said that as the NLD began to realize that in practical terms constitutional amendment would be impossible, it has set prioritisation on the peace process, which is the right move. And the reason that constitutional amendment could not be done is due to the current political situation, transitional relating issues, the position of the military, the condition of the ethnic armed forces and the nature of the constitution itself.
He stressed that if the NLD is too near to the military, peace negotiation with the ethnic armed groups would be difficult and if it confronted head on with the military, peace would be pushed far away and thus it is hoped to apply a balance approach.
However, Chairman of the Mon National Party, Nai Ngwe Thein said the government has done nothing for the ethnic nationalities so far and that without constitutional change peace deliberation would be impossible to carry on. He said that the NLD should push for federalism and equality, adding that consultation and negotiation with the ethnic nationalities are needed.
Core theme remains constitutional crisis
Whenever the observers, academics and the country’s stakeholders would try to find a catchword that has a comprehensive and holistic meaning, we repeatedly fall back on “constitutional crisis, amendment or problematic” as a starting point. It has been so since some years after the independence from the British in 1948 and would continue to be the same, so long as we refuse to take the problem by the horns.
As could be seen that various interpretation and beating around the bush have been the order of the day, without coming to the root cause. Because of this, coming back to the one hundred days assessment in office of the NLD regime, nothing can be more important than the achievement of peace and national reconciliation, which has its roots in structuring, amending or rewriting the constitution, in the first place. This is not to say the NLD has not yet started the process, but to ponder on how the stakeholders could do it together, within the mould of 21CPC, in a more effective way.
Current undertakings
Beyond one hundred days in the office, NLD has undertaken ambitious and bold steps that shows its earnest commitment to make 21CPC a success.
- On 11 July 2016, President Htin Kyaw signed two announcements regarding the formation of “National Reconciliation and Peace Center” (NRPC) – Announcement No. 50/2016 – and “Peace Commission” (PC) – Announcement No. 51/2016; the former headed by Aung San Suu Kyi and the latter by Dr Tin Myo Win
- On 17 July 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi would meet with the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) headed by General N’Ban La, in Yangon, apart from its Delegation for Political Negotiation (DPN) meeting with the government’s peace team
- Negotiations for the inclusion of heretofore excluded 3 Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) – Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Arakan Army (AA) – which would be headed by U Thein Zaw would meet soon to workout on how to overcome it
- Relaying conditions on how United Wa State Army (UWSA) and National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) could participate in 21CPC without signing the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)
- Government giving green light to the ethnic leadership conference in Mai Ja Yang, Kachin State
- On 8 July 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi met Geng Huichang, China’s minister of security, at the foreign ministry and talked about the peace process and asked for assistance from China as a good neighbour, among others
Perspective
Whatever merits or shortcomings are there to be considered or claimed during the one hundred days honeymoon regime’s stay in the office, 21CPC initiatives would be the most outstanding performance of the NLD.
Its differences with the Union Peace Conference(UPC), started by the former Thein Sein government, is that the 21CPC aimed to strive for real all-inclusiveness of all the EAOs, although the military, while stating it accepts the all-inclusiveness as a principle, seeks to stick to its exclusion of the 3 EAOs that it dislikes. At this writing, negotiation is said to be underway headed by U Thein Zaw from the government side, to extract a sort of commitment from the 3 EAOs that they would give up armed resistance undertakings, to be eligible for peace process participation.
A bigger blunder from Suu Kyi part was to state its Panglong Agreement (1947) political position by underlying that she put more importance on it’s “spirit” than the actual agreement, when the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) meeting, of which she is the leader, took place last month.
For the ethnic nationalities the Panglong Agreement is the only legal bond between the Bamar and non-Bamar states in voluntarily forming a new political entity, the Union of Burma, in 1948.
On top of that she later again angered the ethnic nationalities again when she said that the 21CPC would be a “minus secession Panglong-like” gathering and explained that the 1947 Union of Burma Constitution inclusion of secession clause was just to soothe away the ethnics’ doubt that they would not be overwhelmed by the Bamar majority, instrumental to achieve independence, and that it was in no way seen as a treaty between the states. In other words, this interpretation has irked most of the ethnic leadership, even if they were not thinking of secession and ready to be involved in building a genuine federal union, their inalienable rights of secession could not be taken away by anyone.
Earlier, when governmental formation was taking place, she also refused to compromise with the Shan and Arakan political parties’ plea to let them occupy the state chief minister positions and to form state governments in coalition with the NLD. But the NLD appointed its members to all chief minister positions, stating only that it was part of its grand strategy.
In the nationwide elections, the Arakan National Party (ANP) came out first in its state with the most vote and Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) won the second largest vote in Shan State.
The present situation is that Suu Kyi’s reconciliation with the military seems to be working so far as the governmental function is concerned, although it is still to early to predict whether the military will take orders without question, especially if the government is to declare nationwide, unilateral ceasefire to level the playing field, and taking in the 3 excluded EAOs without reservation against the military will, as examples.
As for the reconciliation with the ethnic groups, armed and unarmed, the ball is just starting to roll. It is true that NLD and Suu Kyi have been in touch formally with the 8 EAOs that have signed the NCA, the relationship with the non-signatory EAOs has just begun last month and the upcoming meeting with the UNFC would be seen in a good light. The same goes for the meeting with the other EAOs like UWSA and NDAA, which should be meeting the government and Suu Kyi in Naypyitaw soon.
Regarding her approach with the ethnic political parties, there has been no earnest meeting to exchange political views, as she might consider not necessary having won the landslide election and actually don’t need any coalition partner to govern. But as she has professed and committed to a national reconciliation-based administration, she has taken in ethnic individuals into the government, which could be said that the approach is individually based, rather than working with ethnic-based parties as coalition partners. For in a coalition government there is a kind of “coalition agreement” that has to be worked out first in every aspects of policy-making.
The NLD doesn’t seems to be ready for such agreement and the ethnic parties also don’t have that right to ask for it, so to speak. But if it is really going to a national reconciliation administration, the “coalition agreement” is a must, for without it the NLD undertaking could not pass as a national reconciliation government and would remain a one party decision-making administration.
While Suu Kyi’s meeting Geng Huichang, China’s minister of state security, during the week, no doubt must have centered on how to cope with the EAOs along the Shan State-China border, the Chinese position seemed to be the same as before, which is not taking side in the conflict and instead holding on to play the role of a go-between in resolving the problem. China has repeatedly said humanitarian aids and ethnic to ethnic relationship along the border could not be curtailed and would not interfere.
As such, Suu Kyi and NLD are open to the option of mapping out a feasible working relationship with the EAOs, including all ethnic nationalities groups, and the military. For military solution or annihilation of the EAOs could not be achieved or entertained, as could be seen from such failed military regimes’ decisions of the past, all these years.
To sum up, Suu Kyi and NLD would need to be sensitive to the ethnic aspirations and the Panglong Agreement of 1947 for that matter. The sooner she accepts that equitable power and resources sharing as a way to go, the faster the political settlement could be achieved. And in order to be there the creation of a level political playing field, with the military coming on board, would be the basic necessity, so that nationwide unilateral ceasefire could be declared and the atmosphere of peace be restored, paving way for the beginning of real earnest national reconciliation talks.
