Similar to many ethnic armed resistance groups in Myanmar, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) has fought for decades for the liberation and autonomous rule of its people.
Ta’ang also known as “Palaung” inhabit mostly the highlands of northern Shan State, including some very remote places. Under the 2008 constitution, the TNLA, an armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) formed in 1992, was designated as a Special Administered Zone. However, in practice, this autonomy existed only in name. As a result, the TNLA’s never-ending conflict with the military has been influenced by unfulfilled promises.
However, the military seizure in February 2021 has provided the TNLA with a remarkable chance to realize its aspirations of achieving confederacy status.
Since the coup, the TNLA has attempted to use peaceful approaches to strengthen its position. It has largely avoided confrontation with the military. Unlike other ethnic armed groups, such as the Chin National Front, the Kachin Independence Army, the Karen National Union, and the Karenni Army and Karenni National Progressive Party, which were openly aligned with the National Union Government (NUG) – a parallel government established by legislators expelled by the coup – and actively fought against the military, the TNLA adopted a more nuanced strategy. Although the Ta’ang group has been an important source of training and weapons for new forces resisting the junta, it has avoided publicizing this support. It kept its engagement with the NUG on an informal level, instead allowing Ta’ang civil society groups and politicians to lead the way in building these relationships.
For example, it collaborates with the Ta’ang Political Consultative Committee (TPCC), a forum founded after the coup by Ta’ang politicians and civil society leaders to achieve the aim of autonomy. The TPCC is also a member of the National Unity Consultative Council, a national forum linked to the NUG. Furthermore, the TNLA Secretary General Tar Bone Kyaw’s younger brother, Mai Win Htoo, is the NUG’s deputy minister for federal union affairs. The TNLA has also provided asylum to a large number of activists, including Myanmar, Ta’ang, and other ethnicities, who are active with resistance groups and have fled the brutal crackdowns.
Despite the distrust of the military and knowing that the military may not amend the constitution until after handing over power to a nominally civilian government and being willing to accept the full range of their political demands, the TNLA and its Brotherhood Alliance, particularly the Arakan Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, continued to engage in dialogue with the regime. In doing this, it could keep the stability in its territory and institutionalize its administration.
It has been reported that the TNLA has amassed hundreds of newly recruited soldiers in its controlled territories and surrounding townships, including the townships of Tangyan, Kyaukme, and Hsipaw. The TNLA claims to have established local governing bodies, judicial systems, schools, and a Federal Law Academy in these areas. There are now more than 1,500 staff members who work in the TNLA’s political wing, the PSLF’s bureaucracy. This workforce is dispersed to thirteen departments, ranging from forestry and public relations to customs such as tax collection.
Furthermore, its alliances such as the KIA and the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the most powerful of which controls an autonomous territory in Shan State, supplied the TNLA with the weapons and training it required to establish its security forces. “In 2022, I had to attend extracurricular courses. Commando combat training was quite tough and lasted for seven months. I believe many well-trained and good fighters will emerge this year,” said a TNLA soldier interviewed by Frontier.
According to reports, the TNLA has about 7,000 to 10,000 personnel who are well-armed and militarily competent.
At the same time, it strengthened its ties with its alliance in order to oust the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South from the northern part of Shan State. After signing the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with the government in 2015, the RCSS/SSA-S made advances farther north into territory that was previously held by the TNLA and the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-North. In spite of this, the TNLA and SSPP were successful in wiping out the RCSS/SSA-S in late 2021 and were able to expand their territory in Namtu, Hsipaw, and Kyaukme townships.
It is also seen that the TNLA has been working with Ta’ang civil society groups to uphold the rule of law, provide health and education services, and enhance the local economy. For example, it has built a structure of bureaucrats that functions in a manner similar to that of the General Administration Department of the state government. This system includes a central office, five district-level offices, eighteen offices at the township level, and a great number of offices at the village tract level. As the lower-ranking officials came from the villages they were eventually integrated into the TNLA system. In addition, the informal village leaders are also a part of the administrative system. These leaders often do their jobs from home and get support from the local community. In most cases, they are rewarded in non-monetary ways, such as by receiving supplies like rice and other necessities as payment for their services.
The post-coup, TNLA positions itself in ways that reflect its long-term objective of obtaining autonomy. It was able to build up its administrative capabilities, military strength, and territories. So, should the TNLA continue with its present aggressive stance, which seeks to secure control of its territories and increase its territory, it is possible that it may come into conflict with the military as well as with other ethnic armed groups. It’s possible that the people these organizations claim to represent will force them to take action. However, in order to attain such an ambition, the TNLA should place less emphasis on military maneuvers that may lead to conflict with the military or other ethnic armed groups as it converts to a quasi-state status instead of placing greater focus on supporting the Ta’ang and non-Ta’ang communities.
Note* The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.
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