The Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) splinter group armed engagement which has been brewing even before the start of the Union Peace Conference (UPC) or 21st Century Panglong Conference (21CPC) escalated into a full-blown conflict, resulting in hundreds of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees fleeing to the inner side of the country and also to the Thai side of the border. Accordingly, more than 4,000 people have fled the violence so far.
Adding to this is the military, also known as Tatmadaw, offensives on Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA), Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) and Palaung State Liberation Army/Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA), which are in no way helpful or compatible to end the armed ethnic conflict, raging for some seven decades since the beginning of independence from the British in 1948.
The much touted 21CPC held from 31 August to 3 September in Naypyitaw, which the State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi vowed to be as all-inclusive as possible, so that it could pave way to end the ethnic armed conflict and eventually create an environment conducive for appropriate peace talks, has not materialized, to the chagrin of Suu Kyi and many concerned stakeholders, except for the military faction that has sidelined the 3 Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) that it dislike.
But the Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing said in his opening speech of the 21CPC said that the Tatmadaw has all through out the different eras actively participated in the peace-building and unity of the country. Furthermore, he said that even though there might be difference of opinion, the Tatmadaw is determined to achieve peace, as the negative side of the war directly affected both parties, the EAOs and as well the Tatmadaw troops.
Additionally, he stressed: “I believe we could overcome this task (of achieving peace) through the strength of unity. For this I want to again confirmed that the Tatmadaw is steadfastly performing the task to its commitment of achieving peace at all cost”.
Despite all these good will gesture and colourful speech, the war escalated immediately after the 21CPC, dashing all the hope of peaceful atmosphere on the ground and adding thousands of refugees and IDPs to the already appalling figures.
But before turning to the said forced migration, let us first look at the latest escalation of ethnic armed engagement that has poisoned the situation, which could push back the peace process, due to the failed decision-making of the powers that be.
War in Kachin, Shan and Karen States
To understand the recent armed conflict escalation, it is necessary to go a bit back into the backdrop of ethnic conflict situation.
The ethnic resistance to Bamar domination has started almost immediately after the achievement of independence from the British in 1948. The Karen revolted, due to the racial conflict between the Bamar and Karen sometimes earlier, coupled with the then Prime Minister U Nu’s removing of all Karen officers including General Smith Dun and replacing it with General Ne Win, a Bamar or Burmese. The Karen National Union (KNU) declared war to the Burmese government on 31 January 1949 and captured towns, including Insein close to Rangoon. It took several months before the government troops could recapture the lost towns and was, for a time, even mocked as “Yangon (Rangoon) government” for the rest of the territories were either under insurgents control or could not be ruled.
On 14 June 1949 the KNU proclaimed the Karen Free State or Kawthoolei together with the Four Principles. The then KNU President Saw Ba U Gyi created the said Four Principles, which said: 1. Surrender is out of the question. 2. Recognition of the Karen State must be completed. 3. We shall retain our arms. 4. We shall determine our destiny. These principles have formed the heart of the KNU insurgency ever since.
Due to the political grievances of the non-Bamar ethnic groups over equal representation, power and resources sharing, coupled with the then Prime Minister U Nu’s declaration of Buddhism as a state religion, all assorted ethnic groups rose up in arms. By the end of 50s and early 60s Burma was to experience the full blown civil war that encompassed almost the whole country.
To make the long story short, the insurgency was at its height, when the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) was backed by China until it changed the stance of exporting its brand of communism in late 80s, eventually withdrawing material support to the CPB.
In 1989, the ethnic troops within the CPB mutinied and struck deals with the then military’s Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) government. Out of the chaos the United Wa State Army (UWSA), Mongla or National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and Kokang or Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) came into existence, made up from the former CPB units. The former two have ceasefire agreement with the Tatmadaw for more than twenty years, while the latter is rejected and hated by the military for trying to stage a comeback to reassert its authority by attacking government positions in February last year, which the Tatmadaw has helped installed with its proxy.
After the relative calm, intermittently punctuated with on and off military clashes between the EAOs and the Tatmadaw in southern Shan State and Karen State, the military regime confident with its new strategy pressed the EAOs to come under its wing through its Border Guard Force (BGF) scheme starting from 2009, coupled with the government announcement that all ceasefires signed as “null and void”. The main reason being that the military-drawn 2008 constitution promulgation expressed “only one army” regulation and thus all other military organizations must either be absorbed or demobilised.
With this pressure, the regime’s economic, political and military pressures followed, like blocking Chinese border trade through the KIO’s Laiza headquarters, ordering the closure of all but two of the KIO liaison offices in government- controlled areas, barred a Kachin Political Party, Kachin State Progressive Party (KSPP), from registering and contesting in the 2010 elections, and referred to ceasefire groups as “insurgents” in the media; and attacking the MNDAA (Kokang) and captured their headquarters (August 2009), many militia groups reported military build-up near their outposts and some have even been attacked – the worse being in Kachin state and Northern Shan State. (Source: Border Guard Force Scheme – Myanmar Peace Monitor)
But despite such pressures, the ethnic resistance continued, which prompted the government to change its aggressive stance on August 18, 2011 when President Thein Sein pledged to make the ethnic issue a national priority, offering dialogue with all armed groups and dropping key preconditions for talks, namely the BGF requirement. Nevertheless the BGF scheme remains a part of the government’s peace plan and is listed as point 8 in the Union level peace negotiations’ 8-points: “To coordinate existence of only a single armed force in accord with the Constitution”, according to Myanmar Peace Monitor.
Following Thein Sein’s peace initiative, after four years of Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) documentation was worked out and 8 EAOs out of 21 signed the document on 15 October 2015. Thus the splitting of the EAOs into two camps of signatory and non-signatory, with the military going down hard on the non-signatory, particularly the KIO/KIA, SSPP/SSA, MNDAA, TNLA and Arakan Army (AA), reportedly to pressure them to sign the NCA.
In the course of NCA document formulation, all EAOs have signed either state or union level ceasefire agreements, with the exception of KIO/KIA. But in the aftermath of NCA signing on 15 October 2015, the regime seems to be also nullifying the state and union level ceasefire agreements and conducting offensives on those non-signatory EAOs to push them to sign the NCA.
For the moment, the non-signatory EAOs are pushing for all-inclusiveness participation, tripartite dialogue composition, reformation of the Burma Army and genuine federal union formation as their key demand and is in the process of negotiation. Parallel to this, the military has increased its offensives in Kachin, Shan and Karen States, doing disservice to the peace process, while creating hardship for the ethnic population.
Recent conflict escalation
On the eve and aftermath of the UPC or 21CPC, escalation of armed engagement between the Tatmadaw and the non-signatory EAOs were registered and becoming more visible.
While the ongoing on and off military offensives in Kachin and Shan States are not new and have been ongoing for the last four years or so, the large scale conflict close to the Thai border, in Karen State is a new development since the peace process started, which also seems to signify that the Tatmadaw is more on its war path and less on peaceful negotiations.
DKBA
Clashes reportedly first broke out on June 29, when government troops tried to secure the area ahead of Burma Army South-eastern Division Commander Gen. Tin Maung Win’s visit to Myawaddy.
On 12 September, nearly 40 armed clashes occurred between the Tatmadaw, supported by the BGF and the Democratic Karen Benevolence Army (DKBA) splinter group, also known by its political setup name Klohtoobaw Karen Organization (KKO), over a dispute over illegal taxation along the Asia Highway in Karen State, which remains unresolved. The splinter group is said to be led by Saw San Aung and Saw Kyaw Thet, two DKBA colonels that has been leading the ethnic armed group’s recent operations.
State media reported on 12 September that four soldiers from the DKBA were killed and three others detained, and that “some army officers from the Tatmadaw sacrificed their lives for the country” in the course of nearly 40 clashes between the two sides.
Another media source however reported quite differently when a soldier fighting with the DKBA said: “I witnessed a pile of BGF soldier corpses. I guess there might have been around 100 of them.”
The KNU has protested to the Chairman of National Reconciliation and Peace Committee on September 10 and sent copies to the departments concerned asking for the de-escalation of ongoing conflict arising from military operations launched by government troops and BGF in Mae Tha Waw area.
However, the Tatmadaw on 16 September replied that the operation is a limited one and would not effect other areas, which it was bound to undertake as the DKBA is harassing its troops and issued statement tantamount to declaration of war on the government. But the DKBA countered that it was pushed to defend itself, due to the Tatmadaw’s reinforcements and expansion into its controlled areas.
Most fighting has taken place on the recently opened Asia Highway and an older road that also links Myawaddy and Kawkareik in Karen State and at this writing the fighting is still ongoing.
KIO/KIA
Coinciding with State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s visit to Europe and the United States, Burmese government forces on 15 September carried out artillery and ground attacks against outposts near the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) headquarters in Laiza.
KIA spokesman Col. Naw Bo said that Burmese troops had launched assaults on two of its front-line outposts in Waingmaw Township and a security post near Laiza.
“On 15 September, our outposts in an area known as Kinyobum to the west of the Laiza headquarters were shelled by the Tatmadaw stationed on Khara Hill,” he said. “On the same morning, government forces also launched an attack on our positions on Ingkhambum Hill near the Myitkyina‐Bhamo Highway in Waingmaw Township.”
The KIA spokesman said both sides also exchanged gunfire on 14 September morning between Waingmaw and Dawhpumyang townships.
Apart from continuous reinforcement of the Tatmadaw, these act of offensives are seen as provocations by the Kachin leadership, in order to derail the peace process.
SSPP/SSA
Less than a week ahead of Burma’s historic 21CPC, the Burmese army launched an offensive against the SSPP/SSA in northern Shan State’s Lashio District, according to an SSPP/SSA official.
On August 28, 2016, the Burma Army launched an attack on the SSPP/SSA-controlled Loi Je mountain range, one of the highest vantage points in central Shan State, overlooking SSPP/SSA territories west of the Salween, the heartlands of the UWSA to the east, and strategic river crossings in-between. Attacking this hugely important mountain stronghold, which the SSPP/SSA — and likely the UWSA — will use every means to defend, is therefore a deliberate provocation to war.
SHAN report of 5 September said that the Burmese military continues to reinforce its troop strength in SSPP/SSA territory, despite calls to seek an end to the conflict by the ethnic armed group at UPC, some three weeks ago, in Naypyitaw.
Refugees and IDPs
The armed conflict escalation have contributed to another influx of refugees and IDP population, particularly in Shan and Karen States.
According to the definition of refugees and displaced persons: Refugees are people who are outside the country of their nationality “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted” (1951 Refugee Convention). Internally displaced persons (IDPs) have fled their homes but have not crossed an international frontier.
The UNHCR Factsheet of February 2016 shows 1,53 million IDPs, with a breakdown of Kachin and Northern Shan States 96,000; Rakhine or Arakan State 120,000; Kayah [Karenni], Mon, Karen States and Tanintharyi [Tenasserim] Region 200.000; People without citizenship [IDP returnees but not IDPs in Rakhine State] 940,000; Other peoples of concern [additional IDPs in Bago, Shan (East) and Shan (South) 170,000].
The UNHCR verified refugee population report of 31 August 2016 is 103,823, which are distributed all along the Thai side of the border.
As for the refugee count in China, following the Kokang conflict that drove some70,000 people over to China’s Yunan Province, the UN has been unable to verify.
Reportedly, one year after the conflict and 27,000 refugees still remain in China, according to the MNDAA the major donor of a Kokang Refugee Assistance Program. The said number cannot be confirmed by major international humanitarian groups, due to the difficulty accessing the border areas of China.
In April this year Shan Human Rights Foundation released new estimates that over 20,000 Kokang are living in limbo in makeshift camps in neighbouring Yunnan Province in China, a number much larger than a UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) figure from January 2016 stating that about 4,000 Kokang remain displaced, out of the 70,000 who reportedly were uprooted in 2015.
“We don’t have any information on Kokang refugees in China, as we don’t have access to those areas,” said Vivian Tan, a spokeswoman for the UN refugee agency, UNHCR.
Accordingly, the UN has not been able to provide the refugees with any help, she added.
Furthermore, in Thailand there are some 2-3 million migrant workers, many of whom are acutely vulnerable and left their homeland for similar reasons to the refugees.
Perspective
From the outset Burma’s refugee and IDPs problems have been mostly man-made disasters, safe for natural disasters like cyclones and earthquakes that occasionally hit the country.
The main man-made disaster is the civil war which has its roots in political grievances, that again is anchored in the need to amendment the constitution. This constitutional crisis, that has plagued the country from the very beginning since the independence in 1948, has created the ethnic resistance and armed struggle and in turn, forced migration.
Thus the armed adversaries first need to end the war so that peace negotiations and political settlement could be worked out. But it gets stuck in the first step as animosity could not be curtailed and more importantly, the inability to build trust earnestly.
Building trust so that animosity could be transformed into giving the benefit of the doubt, if not harmony immediately, practical good-will gesture has first to be shown. And in practical terms it means refraining from launching military offensives and better still, withdrawing to safe distance from all the front-line positions, to show that the Tatmadaw means business. And the best option for the Tatmadaw would be to declare unilateral ceasefire.
But just the contrary is happening and no one should wonder why trust could not be built between the EAOs and the Tatmadaw, much less making progress in the ongoing peace talks.
Seen from the given political position of the Tatmadaw – rejecting meaningful genuine federalism – and its aggressive push to escalate the conflict in Kachin, Shan and Karen States, it is imperative that it is not keen to really achieve ceasefire. If this is the situation, we won’t be able to strive for peace, much less political settlement.
In order to meet each other half way, the military would need to do away with its self-employed saviour role of the nation and sole protector of the country’s sovereignty. Because with this kind of attitude, it would only see all the EAOs as destructive elements and insurgents, not equal negotiation partners, with real political grievances, that are also striving for a fair share ownership of the sovereignty, equality and rights of self-determination, which they are entitled to; as their forefathers have joined the Union of Burma in 1948, voluntarily as equal rightful partners.
Another factor is the Tatmadaw should not to cling to its exclusion of 3 EAOs, by demanding repentance and surrender in order to be allowed participation in the peace process, and also agree to all-inclusiveness in the peace process.
Further, it should not be entertaining the idea that military pressure could push the non-signatory EAOs to sign the NCA. The military pressure has never worked with the EAOs if lessons could be learned from the past failures. The military coercive pressure, just a few years back, to ram in its BGF scheme so that it could neutralize the EAOs is the glaring example of failed decision-making.
Consequently, it should also be open to the amendment of NCA that all could agree upon, for the non-signatory United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), a seven member ethnic armed alliance, refusal to sign it stems from the dissatisfaction over lack of all-inclusiveness.
As for all the refugees and IDPs to return home durable and sustainable ceasefire atmosphere is a must, which means lasting political settlement has to be in place, for without this nothing would really happen. Besides, even if the said condition is met, there are hosts of conditions that still need to be tackle.
There is no doubt that Suu Kyi has real political will to resolve this forced migration problematic and achieve peace for the whole country. In her 21CPC opening speech part of her speech explicitly stressed: “With worries and hopes, our citizens are watching us. Those from [conflict] areas are hopefully waiting [for a positive outcome]. War refugees running here and there, made up of various age groups, have had their hopes dimmed for quite a long time. This time, they are watching with fearful eyes on how things will turn out. We can’t afford to forget their suffering.”
Also during Suu Kyi’s Thailand visits in June, an agreement on cooperation between the Thai and Burmese governments was reached to facilitate the return of Burmese refugees. During her visit, Suu Kyi publicly welcomed the refugees back and said they were Burma’s responsibility. Later in June, the Burmese government announced it would repatriate 196 refugees from the border camps as an initial step, although there was no timeline attached.
The two concerned countries, international community and the United Nations are banking on the durable ceasefire that would enable to start a long process of repatriation program. But now it seems the ambitious program would have to wait much longer, with the escalation of the armed conflict producing more refugees coming from Karen State, as it is supposed to be a test case for international engagement, on repatriation in South-east Burma, that have the potential to contribute to such processes.
For now the repatriation would have to be shelved, if not totally abandoning it altogether, until there is durable peace with political settlement and genuine reconciliation become the order of the day.
