Burma’s political landscape will not be the same any more, after Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory, now popularly dubbed as “political tsunami” by keen observers, including Sai Nyunt Lwin, the secretary general of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), a party representing Burma’s largest ethnic group after the majority Bamar, whose party won sizeable seats in the nationwide elections, ranking fourth in Upper and Lower Houses – Amyotha and Pyithu Hluttaw – combined, after Arakan National Party (ANP), another party that did quite well.
SNLD comes out third and ANP fourth in State/Region parliament with 26 and 23 seats respectively.
Let us ponder on how the prospective change could affect the ethnic political parties, ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the whole spectrum of non-Bamar ethnic nationalities after the change of guard that would take place in February next year.
The assumption before the NLD landslide win of the historic nationwide elections was that the ethnic parties would be able to act as king maker or coalition partners with the NLD and form a coalition with either one or two influential ethnic parties like SNLD and ANP. But now the whole game plan has to be altered and instead all will now depend solely on Aung San Suu Kyi’s initiative, on how her utterance and commitment of national unity cooperation will unfold in the real world of Burma’s politics.
Ethnic Parties
Let us first ponder on the faith of ethnic political parties.
Defying the ethnic parties’ calls of not to run candidates in their home states, the NLD has surprisingly won the elections almost in all the ethnic states, leaving many ethnic parties without representation, or with just a handful of seats in the national and local assemblies.
It was a total political onslaught and to the chagrin of many, the remaining “last man standing” parties were only the SNLD, in the country’s eastern Shan State, and the ANP, which is based in the restive western state of Rakhine.
The final count published on 16 November, in the Global New Light of Myanmar for the two best ethnic parties are: 13 Pyithu Hluttaw, 3 Amyotha Hluttaw, 26 State/Region Hluttaw for SNLD; and 12 Pyithu Hluttaw, 10 Amyotha Hluttaw, 23 State/Region Hluttaw for ANP. Other than that, PNO and Ta’ang National Party got 4 seats each in Pyithu and Amyotha Hluttaw combined, and 6 and 7 seats respectively in State/Region Hluttaw. All the rest either didn’t get elected at all or just got neglectable one or two seats.
According to Reuters, NLD spokesman Win Htein said the party would choose members of ethnic parties for cabinet positions, including the vice presidency and would consider appointing non-NLD chief ministers in Shan and Rakhine states.
He added that the NLD would not consider a coalition with ethnic parties, since it has won a landslide majority.
Many took the NLD approach as being high-handed and ANP chairman Aye Maung told Reuters:
“I’m sceptical about their ability to handle this perennial issue without the active participation of ethnic parties,” and that if the NLD asserts control over regional governments in ethnic areas, “it will be just like the situation under the USDP government.”
And thus, the ethnic parties’ hope of becoming a king maker has turned into a minor junior partner, where coalition will be defined not on party coalition basis, but picking individuals from ethnic parties in union-level administration, but possible coalition arrangement between NLD and SNLD in Shan State, state-level government. The ANP that won the majority vote in Rakhine State would form the government, but the chief minister must have the approval of NLD-installed President.
Why ethnic parties failed?
Sadly, the election losers were not just the regime’s Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and other assorted political parties, but also the ethnic bloc as a whole, only with the exception of the SNLD and ANP.
Quite a few reasons were given why such a landslide or political tsunami happened in ethnic homesteads. But Sithu Aung Myint, a well known political commentator has made a convincing supposition, which included some of the following points.
The first point was the ethnic parties’ election campaign issues were too general and not much of a difference with the NLD, which also lobbied with the general theme of federalism, right of self governance. A detailed persuasive thematic approach was not seen during the campaign, but were only banking on the fact that the ethnic population would vote for their same kind. This has proven otherwise and the ethnic parties received less votes than they have expected.
The second point was that except for the ANP, all the other ethnic parties were too divided, which made it hard to unify and organize the ethnic population, leading to the spreading of votes and denying them the victory.
The third point was the ethnic parties popping up after 2010, due to the military clique creation of ethnic parties, their participation in the elections and made them won seats so as to make the parliaments colourful. Some were even wooed and given minister posts. The old ethnic parties formed since 1990, with the populace backing, had tried in vain for the fusion to enter 2015 elections, but were rejected for most were satisfied to work for the ruling party as subordinate parties. This behaviour also made them lost the elections and some didn’t even win a single seat in the elections.
The NLD candidates competing in the ethnic states were not Bamar, but the ethnic people themselves and when this was combined with the aura of Aung San Suu Kyi, the home stead ethnic parties lost the elections.
Another factor was that many of the voters were of mixed blood between various ethnicities and mixture of Bamar ethnic with different ethnic groups, due to increased urbanization and they didn’t any reason to vote of the home grown ethnic parties.
The most important deciding factor may be the consideration and implementation of tactical voting by the ethnic population. For by voting for the NLD, which also fielded ethnic candidates, the spread of their votes on various ethnic parties could be hindered and in turn, helped to realize the call for change of the government.
Aung San Suu Kyi’s call for “just look at and vote for the NLD party, not the candidates, if you want change” had been totally effective, although people at first thought this wouldn’t be in line with acceptable political ethics.
Ethnic armed organizations
After the government initiated partial-ceasefire signing, dubbed nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) on 15 October, between the 8 EAOs and the regime, the ethnic political landscape is divided into signatory and non-signatory factions among themselves, apart from categorically and effectively being separated into a country of ceasefire and war zones.
The eight signatory groups included the Karen National Union (KNU), the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army South (RCSS/SSA), the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council (KNU/KNLA-PC), the Chin National Front (CNF), the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), the Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLA), and the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF). The government has announced that the seven remaining invited signatories may sign when they are ready; however, these armed groups have announced that they will not sign the NCA unless an additional six armed groups are included. To date, the government has refused to include these groups.
Non-signatories include the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA), the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), the Shan State Progress Party/ Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland -Khaplang (NSCN-K)
The six armed groups that the government has refused to include in the NCA are the Ta’Ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Arakan Army (AA), as these groups do not have bilateral ceasefires in place with the government; and the Wa National Organization (WNO), the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU), and the Arakan National Council (ANC), as the government believes that these organizations do not have active armies.
Meanwhile the Burma Army known as Tatmadaw continues its offensives on SSPP/SSA, KIO/KIA, TNLA in Shan and Kachin States, particularly targeting the SSPP/SSA by shelling its Wan Hai headquarters and staging fake battles to create the climate of war and more pretext to heightened the military offensives.
On 11 November, SSPP/SSA released a rebuttal statement, regarding the Burma Army’s accusation.
The rebuttal said that on 9 October, the Tactical Command (sa-ka-hka) 2 in Mong Nawng resorted to firing heavy weapons as well as small arms in the darkness of the night as if a battle was taking place. Later, referring to this incident, the Myawaddy News Agency reported in an article on 10 October, that the Burma Army garrison of Mong Nawng was attacked by the SSA.
The statement said that Mong Nawng incident was a ruse by the pro-war hawks to cook up and frame the SSA. The Burmese military operations that began on 6 October has been solely retaliated by its own troops and there have been no aid or help from other armed organizations.
It further stressed that the SSPP/SSA have no intention whatsoever, of going on a warpath; and although its organization has been deployed all over the Shan State and capable of initiating attacks and raids, it has refrained to do so except for self-defence in unavoidable situation.
The statement explicitly refuted all allegations and accusations of the Burma Army’s Mong Nawng fiasco.
Again, on 15 November, the department of information and news of SSPP/SSA released an analysis on the ongoing Tatmadaw offensives as a deliberately planned operation, much more than the normal area cleansing procedure, with the aim to declare emergency military rule, in the wake of the government’s party election landslide loss to the NLD.
The analysis pointed out some hard facts for its above mentioned assumption, which included the Tatmadaw carrying out sudden attacks on SSA positions; even after withdrawal from Ta Hsam Poo jetty area as demanded by the Tatmadaw, in the hope of ending the armed clashes, the attacks still continue; the Union Peace-making Working Committee (UPWC), the government organ, was not really involved to help stop the war; Tatmadaw staging fake battles and employing air raids on SSA positions; and shelling of Wan Hai headquarters and surrounding villages.
Similar to what has been happening with the SSPP/SSA, the KIO/KIA also faces offensive threat to its headquarters.
On 15 November, Kachinland News reported that the Myitkyina-based Northern Regional Command of the Burma Army has warned the KIA that the Burma Army will launch attacks on the KIA headquarters if the KIA cannot account for an incident that took place in Sinbo Township. Several unknown individuals approached the Burma Army’s 141st Light Infantry Battalion Headquarters on 13 November, leading to a skirmish on that evening. According to the Burma Army, these individuals were from the KIA.
At this writing, the Tatmadaw has heightened its offensives on Kachin and Shan positions with aerial bombings and infantry operations.
VOA report of 16 November said that one local resident, who did not want to be named, told VOA, “We can see aircrafts flying in the sky and the whole Mohnyin town can see it clearly. We saw bombarding, but couldn’t see the explosions as they were dropped behind mountains.”
Colonel Sai La of Shan State Army, another rebel group which refused to sign the government initiated ceasefire deal, told VOA Burmese “the heaviest attack” in recent clashes began early on 16 November and continued until evening.
“Six helicopters and three jet fighters were used in heavy assaults with bombardments and gunfire. Today’s attack is the heaviest,” Sai La said.
Ying Harn Hpa of Shan Human Rights Foundation told VOA Burmese thousands of civilians have been forced to flee the conflict.
“The latest clashes forced more than 2,000 people (from their homes), reaching a total of more than 8,000 to nearly 9,000,” Ying Harn Hpa said.
NCA Process
The NCA structure has Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM) at its top. The formation of two committees followed after several rounds of JICM. They are: Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC)– the word ceasefire not initialled– and Union Political Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC).
According to The Global New Light of Myanmar report on 29 October, representatives from the government and the 8 EAOs signatories of the NCA held a Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) meeting in Yangon on 28 October. It was the first meeting of the committee after its formation, according to the MPC’s Senior Advisor Hla Maung Shwe. Following the NCA signing, the committee was formed along with the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC) during the three-day Joint implementation Coordination Meeting (15-17 Oct) in Nay Pyi Taw. The JMC will be responsible for dealing with military matters, while the UPDJC will deal with political issues. According to the NCA, ceasefire monitoring activities will be undertaken transparently and responsibly to ensure strict adherence to the military Code of Conduct agreed to by all signatories. Once finalised, the Code of Conduct will use clearly-worded language, as will the monitoring guidelines for Union, State and Regional level committees. These are to be completed within 30 days of the NCA signing. Likewise, the ceasefire signatories will have to establish a Framework for a Political Dialogue within 60 days and hold political dialogue within 90 days, in accordance with the NCA.
As the JMC is strictly concerned with military matters of demarcation of operational territories and maintaining ceasefire arrangement on the ground, it is believed the government would not interfere much in it. But the UPDJC is quite different and political parties have been allotted with 16 seats, which is now going to be populated by representatives on behalf of some 90 political parties. The legitimacy problem may arise if the non-elected people’s representatives should be entitled to participate, now that the NLD and a handful of ethnic political parties are to be seen as popularly elected people’s representatives.
The initial suspicion of scaling down the NLD’s role among political parties is high and the MPC and UPWC’s U Aung Min pushing hard to form such a political representation within the NCA decision-making procedure might be to limit the NLD clout with one against 15 votes in any future decision-making process.
The JMC is said to be formed on three levels of Union, State/Region and Local and the first UPDJC is scheduled to meet on 24 November, shortly after the selection of 16 representatives from some 90 political parties targeted to have finished by 21 November, according to U Aung Min’s directive or suggestion.
On 15 November, the President promises smooth handover of the administration and the NLD in turn stresses national reconciliation, where he delivered a speech touching the NCA issue. He said: “Within my government’s five years in office, we have given our best efforts at implementing the required tasks. In particular, we fostered a new political culture of resolving issues through dialogue and negotiations between political forces. In the area of peace, we signed a nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) with eight Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). We continue to strive for the inclusion of the remaining EAOs. The importance of the agreement lies in the political guarantees for resolving armed conflict through political means, and together establishing a federal and democratic Union through political dialogue. The NCA is the best foundation for peace that we leave behind. Efforts are being made to begin political dialogue soon in accordance with the timeline provided in the NCA. I believe the next government will do its best to continue to build on this good foundation.”
Perspective
To conclude, since national reconciliation and federal democracy are the NLD’s professed and cherished mission, it would be well advised to map out the political configuration on the ground reflecting those ideals.
But before speculating further, it is imperative to seriously consider and accept the fact that the people’s tactical voting, whether intentionally or unintentionally, consciously or unconsciously, have paved the way for the landslide win of the NLD, making it possible to embark on the path of national reconciliation and the much touted federal system of democracy.
In this respect, Dr Yan Myo Thein, a well known and famous political commentator’s recent suggestions are valuable.
He said that in order to realize and empower the NLD’s mission statement, incorporating the members with ethnic background from NLD party, together with ethnic political parties members, as chairman and vice chairman in the State and Regional parliaments could foster federalism and nurture trust between Aung San Suu Kyi’s party and the ethnic nationalities.
Also, in Amyotha Hluttaw (Upper House) it should be the same, as Pyithu Hluttaw (Lower House) speaker’s chair will probably be occupied by Aung San Suu Kyi.
If either the ANP or SNLD will be chosen as vice chairman in Amyotha Hluttaw, it will be able to foster and empower the mission’s ultimate goal.
Taking into account that the military is there to stay, at least for sometimes, due to its constitutional privilege of having 25% non-elected seats in all the parliaments and authority to appoint defence, home and border affairs ministers, the NLD according to its reconciliation procedure should only make use of modus vivendi (temporary practical compromise) with the Tatmadaw. But on how this should be implemented depends on Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD leadership.
But despite such built-in, fail-safe constitutional guarantee with 350,000 strong army and 80,000 police force, the military is still nervous and shows that it is not ready to totally yield to the people’s power administration of Suu Kyi. To put it differently, it is hesitant to compromise on the military’s political edge or the status of “a state within a state”.
Already the military is preparing ground and gearing to place Shan and Kachin States under emergency military rule, which is explicitly allowed with the endorsement of the President if the military deems it is necessary, to show that it is the one who is calling the shots, although other considerations like strategic and economic interests – natural resources extraction and land use – might also play the big role.
Dr Aye Maung head of the ANP, on 16 November told RFA that the NLD has broken the ethnic defence line, probably meaning protection of ethnic identities and rights of self-determination, which leads to the depletion of trust between the Bamar-dominated NLD and the ethnic communities. He stressed that to regain back its lost of trust, it will depend on how power sharing in governmental formation, in union and state level, reflects the ethnic composition.
Thus to sum up, the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi will be well advised to first accept that the tactical voting of the bulk of the mass, including all ethic groups, is a mandate given to change the course of the political system from quasi-civilian, unitary to genuine federalism.
Secondly, fostering ethnic cooperation and trust should be the main theme and that the NLD should relentlessly strive to prove by appointing the ethnic members in the governance of the country. Furthermore to win back the trust of the ethnic groups, a hint or even the promise of not to field candidates in ethnic homelands, in future elections, so as to prevent the roll-over effect with the weight of Suu Kyi’s international and domestic aura, like that has happened in the recently finished elections.
Thirdly, to dampen the nervousness of the military that the NLD is in no way going out to destroy or revenge, but to professionalize the military in a gradual manner and that there is no point to escalate the war in Shan and Kachin States to show its displeasure and project its importance within the power structure; plus entertaining the idea to stir up a mini-Cold-War by heightening the war along the Burma-China border unnecessarily.
Finally, implementation of modus vivendi with military is the way to go, if national reconciliation form of governance is to be achieved. It is a tall order, but the first step of securing the mandate to make a change is already secured and there is no reason not to believe that the rest of the tasks could be fulfilled.
The contributor is ex-General Secretary of the dormant Shan Democratic Union (SDU) – Edirtor
